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John Paul Stevens and Equally
Impartial Government
Diane Marie Amann*
Justice John Paul Stevens’s embrace of race-conscious measures to
ensure continued diversity stands in tension with his early rejections of
affirmative action programs. The contrast suggests a linear movement
toward a progressive interpretation of the Constitution’s equality
guarantee; however, examination of Stevens’s writings in biographical
context reveal a more complex story. As a law clerk Stevens had urged
that Justices declare segregation itself unconstitutional in 1948, six years
before the Court took that step. The state’s refusal to admit a qualified
applicant to law school solely on account of her race represented an
individualized wrong, one that bore resonance with the Depression-era
experiences of Stevens’s own family. Stevens would come to describe
unequal treatment as a breach of the sovereign’s duty to govern
impartially. But the Justice did not view race-based means to remedy prior
discrimination in the same light. Only after he shifted attention away from
the injustices of the past and toward expectations of a just future did
Stevens adjudge affirmative action as a permissible means toward an
equally impartial government.

*

Professor of Law and Director of the California International Law Center at
King Hall, University of California, Davis, School of Law. A version of this Article was
presented at a March 2009 symposium on The Honorable John Paul Stevens at the
University of California, Davis, School of Law (Martin Luther King, Jr. Hall). My
thanks to participants there and at workshops of the University of California,
Berkeley, School of Law, and the San Francisco Jurisprudence Café, where aspects of
this research were presented; to Emil Dixon for research assistance; to Senior Articles
Editor Alisha Patterson for painstaking attention to this Article; and to persons who
have talked with me, among them the Honorable John Paul Stevens, for whom I had
the privilege of serving as a law clerk in October Term 1988, the Honorable Louis H.
Pollak, Nellie A. Pitts, Kenneth A. Manaster, Stanley L. Temko, and Robert V.
Allegrini. This Article is dedicated to my father, Robert B. Amann, whose love of
history set me on this path.
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The year was 1948. The place, Washington, D.C. In cane chairs
tucked amid the red velvet draping the chamber of the U.S. Supreme
Court, clerks fresh out of law school watched as Thurgood Marshall
argued that the Constitution compelled Oklahoma to let Ada Lois
Sipuel study law at its flagship university.1 Though not yet forty, the
lead advocate for the NAACP Legal Defense and Educational Fund
was well known to the Justices before whom he had first argued five
years earlier.2 One of the law clerks present recalled that on this day
“Thurgood was respectful, forceful and persuasive — so persuasive
that on the following Monday — only four days after the argument —
the Court unanimously ruled in Sipuel’s favor.”3 A per curiam order
instructed the state that it must give Sipuel — whom the Court
described as “a Negro, concededly qualified” — schooling “in
conformity with the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment and provide it as soon as it does for applicants of any
other group.”4
A few weeks later, Marshall sought a writ of mandamus requiring
the recalcitrant state to admit Sipuel. The law clerk quoted above
urged Justice Wiley B. Rutledge, Jr., to grant the extraordinary writ.
“The mandate of this Court directs the state to provide her with a legal
education ‘in conformity with the equal protection clause,’ ” the clerk
wrote, continuing, “I would think it possible to take judicial notice of
the fact that: (a) a law school for one student cannot be equal, even if
you accept the separate but equal doctrine, and (b) the doctrine of
segregation is itself a violation of the Constitutional requirement.”5 He
1

See John Paul Stevens, Assoc. Justice, U.S. Supreme Court, Address to the
American Bar Association Thurgood Marshall Awards Dinner Honoring Abner Mikva
(Aug. 6, 2005), available at http://www.supremecourtus.gov/publicinfo/speeches/
sp_08-06-05.html [hereinafter Stevens, Address].
2
See Randall Bland, The Making of an Advocate, in THURGOOD MARSHALL: JUSTICE
FOR ALL 22, 22 (Roger Goldman & David Gallen eds., 1992) [hereinafter MARSHALL]
(writing of Marshall’s birth on July 2, 1908); id. at 42-87 (describing Marshall and
NAACP). See generally Adams v. United States, 319 U.S. 312 (1943) (ruling that
federal court had no jurisdiction to try Marshall’s clients). Notably, Justice Felix
Frankfurter referred to Marshall by name, rather than as counsel for petitioner, when
discussing the case at bar. See “F.F.,” Memorandum for the Conference, No. 325 Misc.
Fisher v. Hurst et al. (Feb. 13, 1948) [hereinafter 2/13/48 Frankfurter Mem.], in
William O. Douglas Papers, Manuscript Division, Library of Congress, box 170
[hereinafter Douglas Papers].
3
Stevens, Address, supra note 1.
4
Sipuel v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Okla., 332 U.S. 631, 632-33 (1948) (per
curiam).
5
Memorandum Signed “jps,” Regarding Fisher v. Justices of Okla. S. Ct. et al., at 2
[hereinafter JPS Fisher Mem.] (spacing corrected in this quotation of original), in
Wiley Rutledge Papers, Manuscript Division, Library of Congress, box 157
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concluded that “if there is any chance of granting any relief, I would
do so.”6
The clerk’s call to declare segregation unconstitutional in 1948
astonishes. Marshall had not expressly requested such a ruling.7 No
Justice, nor, it appears, any other law clerk, committed that view to
paper at that time.8 It would not be until 1954 that the Court would
hold segregation unconstitutional in Brown v. Board of Education.9 As
late as the first hearing in that case, another clerk had objected to the
prospect of such a decree.10 “To the argument made by Thurgood
Marshall that a majority may not deprive a minority of its
constitutional right,” clerk William H. Rehnquist wrote in a
memorandum that drew much attention when he became a Justice
decades later, “the answer must be made that while this is sound in
[hereinafter Rutledge Papers]. Documents in this second round of litigation referred
to Sipuel by her married name, Fisher; in an earlier article I made the unfortunate
error of assigning to her the surname of the other litigant in the decision captioned
Fisher v. Hurst, 333 U.S. 147 (1948). See Diane Marie Amann, John Paul Stevens,
Human Rights Judge, 74 FORDHAM L. REV. 1569, 1589 (2006) [hereinafter Amann,
Stevens].
6
JPS Fisher Mem., supra note 5, at 3.
7
See Frankfurter Mem., supra note 2 (admonishing Court in internal
memorandum not to resolve Sipuel’s mandamus petition in manner that might “again
invite discussion about the issue which Thurgood Marshall skilfuly did not explicitly
either accept or reject, namely is segregation constitutionally valid?”) (spelling and
punctuation as in typescript original)).
8
Rutledge alone dissented, but on a ground far narrower than that advanced by
his clerk. See Fisher, 333 U.S. at 151 (Rutledge, J., dissenting) (objecting that state
courts had not complied with Court’s mandate). At least two clerks besides Stevens
recommended grants, but on grounds less bold than Stevens put forward. See
Memorandum Signed “SES,” Fisher (nee Sipuel) v. Hurst et al., in Douglas Papers, supra
note 2, box 170 (recommending in memorandum by Douglas clerk Stanley E.
Sparrowe issuance of order to show cause, and limiting analysis to whether separate
facility proffered was equal); Motion for Leave to File Petition for Writ of Mandamus,
Petition, and Brief in Support Thereof, in Robert H. Jackson Papers, Manuscript
Division, Library of Congress, box 145 (concluding in undated and unsigned
memorandum “GRANT?” on ground that state judges had evaded Court’s mandate).
This assessment reflects examination of the case file papers of some, but not all, of the
Justices who took part in the Sipuel litigation.
9
Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954). Throughout this Article “Brown”
refers solely to this judgment and not to others issued in the course of the litigation.
10
Memorandum Signed “WHR,” A Random Thought on the Segregation Cases
(1952) [hereinafter WHR Mem.], reprinted in Nomination of Justice William Hubbs
Rehnquist to be Chief Justice of the United States: Hearings Before the S. Comm. on the
Judiciary, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. (1986), available at http://www.gpoaccess.gov/
congress/senate/judiciary/sh99-1067/324-325.pdf; see Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 345 U.S.
972 (1953) (ordering reargument); Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 344 U.S. 1, 1 (1952)
(setting argument of consolidated desegregation cases for October 1952).
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theory, in the long run it is the majority who will determine what the
constitutional rights of the minority are.”11 In tone and content the
two clerks’ memoranda could not have diverged more.
Fast forward now to 2007. In Parents Involved in Community Schools
v. Seattle School District No. 1, members of the Court hearkened to the
landmark 1954 ruling with these words: “Before Brown,
schoolchildren were told where they could and could not go to school
based on the color of their skin.”12 The use of Brown to invalidate two
plans designed to prevent resegregation of public schools provoked
the Court’s most senior member, Justice John Paul Stevens, to give
voice to what Professor Andrew Siegel aptly has called “righteous
anger.”13 Stevens wrote in dissent that the principal opinion in Seattle
Schools “fails to note that it was only black schoolchildren who were
so ordered,” and thus “rewrites the history of one of this Court’s most
important decisions.”14 Stevens went so far as to proclaim, “It is my
firm conviction that no Member of the Court that I joined in 1975
would have agreed with today’s decision.”15
It may not surprise that Stevens, the Justice who decried the
majority’s 2007 invocation of Brown, is also the author of the 1948
clerk’s memorandum urging an end to lawful segregation. At first
blush, Stevens’s 1948 memorandum in Sipuel and his 2007 dissent in
Seattle Schools appear as two points on one straight path toward
progressive interpretation of the Equal Protection Clause. In truth,
however, Stevens’s equality jurisprudence has traveled a far more
winding road. Between Sipuel and Seattle Schools may be found
numerous judicial opinions in which Stevens rejected affirmative
action programs that other Justices endorsed.16 Presenting a salient
11
WHR Mem., supra note 10, at 2d page. The memorandum continued: “I realize
that it is an unpopular and unhumanitarian position, for which I have been excoriated
by ‘liberal’ colleagyes, but I think Plessy v. Ferguson was right and should be reaffirmed.” Id. (spelling and punctuation as in typescript original) (referring to Plessy
v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896), overruled by Brown, 347 U.S. at 495); see infra note
16 (describing recent scholarship regarding this memorandum).
12
Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1 (Seattle Schools), 551
U.S. 701, 747 (2007) (plurality opinion) (Roberts, C.J., joined by Scalia, Thomas &
Alito, JJ.).
13
Andrew Siegel, Justice Stevens and the Seattle Schools Case: A Case Study on the
Role of Righteous Anger in Constitutional Discourse, 43 UC DAVIS L. REV. 927, 927
(2010).
14
Seattle Schools, 551 U.S. at 799 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Put precisely, Stevens
directed his objection at the opinion’s author. See infra text accompanying note 147.
15
Seattle Schools, 551 U.S. at 803 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
16
See infra text accompanying notes 96-117, 134 (discussing Stevens’s early equal
protection jurisprudence).
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example is the judgment in Fullilove v. Klutznick.17 Stevens’s dissent in
that 1980 case underscored “our commitment to the proposition that
the sovereign has a fundamental duty to govern impartially” — a
“concept of equal justice under law” that is “served by the Fifth
Amendment’s guarantee of due process, as well as by the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.”18 It then expressed
opposition to the minority set-aside program under review in no
uncertain terms: Stevens likened the statute by which Congress
purported to make amends for the past discrimination of Americans of
African and other ancestries to a law by which the Nazi-era Reichstag
had authorized the ongoing persecution of German Jews.19
How is one to reconcile Justice Stevens’s criticisms of affirmative
action either with his 1948 call to outlaw “segregation itself” or with
his 2007 claim that relying on race in order to maintain school
diversity honors the desegregation legacy of Brown?20 Put more
simply, the question is this: have Stevens’s views on race and the law
changed? The answer is complex. It is yes, it is no, and it is maybe.
The answer is yes for the reason that, at least since 1986, when he
dissented in Wygant v. Jackson Board of Education from the majority’s
rebuke of preferences extended to minority schoolteachers, Stevens
often has supported what are generically called affirmative action
programs.21 But the answer is also no, for the reason that, even after
Wygant, Stevens at times rejected as unconstitutional some such
programs.22 In the end the answer is maybe, for the reason that, even
as Stevens’s ultimate conclusions varied, his methodology did not:
even when supporting race-based classifications, Stevens worked
within the same framework of an equally impartial government that
led him to condemn the classification in Fullilove.23 This Article

17

448 U.S. 448 (1980).
Id. at 533 n.2 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (quoting Hampton v. Mow Sun Wong,
426 U.S. 88, 100 (1976)).
19
Id. at 534 n.5.
20
See JPS Fisher Mem., supra note 5, at 2; supra text accompanying notes 12-15
(quoting dissent in Seattle Schools).
21
Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 313-19 (1986) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting); see infra text accompanying notes 118-34 (examining Stevens’s treatment
of affirmative action in Wygant); infra text accompanying note 96 (discussing
terminology).
22
See infra text accompanying notes 135-50 (discussing Stevens’s later treatments
of affirmative action).
23
See supra text accompanying note 18 (quoting Fullilove, 448 U.S. at 533, 533
n.2 (Stevens, J., dissenting)); see infra text accompanying notes 203-31 (discussing use
of this framework).
18
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examines these complexities. It first sets forth certain of Stevens’s life
experiences, and then elaborates on his jurisprudence of equality. The
Article concludes with a tentative analysis of how life experiences
might have influenced Stevens’s approach to the constitutional law of
equality.
I.

A STORIED LIFE

The twenty-six year old who moved to Washington in September
1947 to clerk for Justice Rutledge already had led a storied life. Earlier
that month, John Paul Stevens had finished his J.D. at Northwestern
University School of Law in Chicago,24 earning a record-high grade
point average and serving as coeditor in chief of the law review.25 He
had spent the first part of the decade as an officer in the U.S. Navy,
much of it at the Hawaii base bombed by Japanese planes on
December 7, 1941. “I went to Pearl in December 1942,” Stevens
recalled much later, “and stayed there almost until the end of the
war.”26 For years he and many others labored to decrypt messages the
Japanese military sent, not realizing that the Americans had broken
the code. Stevens was awarded a Bronze Star for his service. “I did a lot
of work breaking a particular cipher,” he explained. “It involved call
signals. It was very technical.”27
24
Stevens finished during the summer session and offered to begin working for
Rutledge immediately; however, Rutledge insisted he take a week of vacation first, and
so the clerkship began on September 22. See Letter from John Paul Stevens, Assoc.
Justice, U.S. Supreme Court, to Wiley Rutledge, Assoc. Justice, U.S. Supreme Court
(Sept. 4, 1948) [hereinafter 9/4/48 Stevens Letter], in Rutledge Papers, supra note 5,
box 42; Letter from John Paul Stevens, Assoc. Justice, U.S. Supreme Court, to Wiley
Rutledge, Assoc. Justice, U.S. Supreme Court (July 24, 1947), in Rutledge Papers,
supra note 5, box 42; Letter from John Paul Stevens, Assoc. Justice, U.S. Supreme
Court, to Wiley Rutledge, Assoc. Justice, U.S. Supreme Court (July 14, 1947), in
Rutledge Papers, supra note 5, box 42.
25
See George W. Gekas, U.S. House of Representatives, Tribute to U.S. Supreme
Court Associate Justice John Paul Stevens, reprinted in 142 CONG. REC. E1450 (daily
ed. Aug. 1, 1996) (citing Stevens’s academic achievement); John Paul Stevens,
Introductory Comment, 75 NW. U. L. REV. 977, 977 (1981) (discussing his work on
what was then called Illinois Law Review). For details on Stevens’s law school career
and other life experiences not mentioned here, see Amann, Stevens, supra note 5, at
1580-1600.
26
Telephone Interview with John Paul Stevens, Assoc. Justice, U.S. Supreme
Court (June 22, 2005) [hereinafter 6/22/05 Stevens Interview]. Having reported to
Great Lakes Naval Station for his physical the day before the bombing at Pearl Harbor,
“[e]ventually Stevens couldn’t resist joking that his enlistment apparently had
precipitated the war.” KENNETH A. MANASTER, ILLINOIS JUSTICE 38 (2001).
27
6/22/05 Stevens Interview, supra note 26. President Franklin D. Roosevelt
established the Bronze Star Medal to a service member who “on or after December 7,
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There is irony in the fact that the G.I. Bill paid for much of his
postwar legal education.28 For Stevens had been born, on April 20,
1920, into a family whose wealth and prominence newspapers in
Chicago and beyond long had chronicled.29 Two generations earlier,
the Stevenses had moved their dry goods business from Colchester, a
downstate Illinois town named after a village northeast of London.30
The Chas. A. Stevens & Bros. store in Chicago became a favorite of the
elite shoppers who frequented State Street in the downtown Loop.31
One brother, James W. Stevens, known as “J.W.,” established the
Illinois Life Insurance Co., where one of his sons, Raymond, also came
to work.32 Another son, Ernest J. Stevens, managed yet another
Stevens concern, the Loop’s high-end Hotel La Salle.33 He did so with
flair. “We intend to keep the bar open Sundays until we are convinced
that we are doing wrong,” he once declared in defiance of temperance
1941, distinguishes, or distinguished, himself by heroic or meritorious achievement or
service, not involving participation in aerial flight, in connection with military or
naval operations against an enemy of the United States.” Exec. Order No. 9419, 9 Fed.
Reg. 1495 (Feb. 8, 1944).
28
MANASTER, supra note 26, at 38 (writing that “G.I. Bill mostly pa[id] his way”).
29
See, e.g., Mack Denounces Business Leaders, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 14, 1908, at 1
(including Justice’s Great-Uncle Charles in a list of “leading Chicago business men”
against whom the Democratic leader suggested boycott on account of their public
support for that year’s Republican Presidential candidate, William H. Taft); Society at
Palm Beach, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 11, 1909, at 9 (noting that “Mr. and Mrs. Ernest J.
Stevens of Chicago,” who would later give birth to John Paul Stevens, had been feted
aboard New Yorker’s yacht at “one of the largest parties” of season).
30
See ROBERT V. ALLEGRINI, CHICAGO’S GRAND HOTELS: THE PALMER HOUSE HILTON,
THE DRAKE, AND THE HILTON CHICAGO 95 (2005) (discussing Colchester); Chas. A.
Stevens, Loop Merchant, Is Dead at 73, CHI. TRIB., Dec. 25, 1932, at 6 (stating that
Charles, brother of James W., had moved to Chicago in 1879); James W. Stevens, 82,
Hotel Man, Is Dead, N.Y. TIMES, May 15, 1936, at 28 [hereinafter James W. Stevens]
(writing of move from Colchester to Chicago, some time before 1893, by James W.
Stevens, who would become Justice’s grandfather).
31
See Ethel L. Payne, Stevens Integrates on Many Levels, But Rejects the Idea of Fair
Jobs Law, CHI. DEFENDER, July 11, 1953, at 9 (describing store and linking its founding
to Chicago’s 1893 World’s Fair); State Street Rises to Retail Leadership thru Foresight of
Colorful Pioneers, CHI. TRIB., July 8, 1956, at A9 (writing that Charles A. Stevens had
“received some of his training from Marshall Field” before opening his own store in
1890, and naming both among those who made State Street “the world’s busiest and
most concentrated shopping area”).
32
See Charles Lane, Heartbreak Hotel, CHI. MAG., Aug. 2006,
http://www.chicagomag.com/Chicago-Magazine/August-2006/Heartbreak-Hotel
[hereinafter Lane, Hotel]; R. W. Stevens Dies from a Pistol Shot, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 24,
1933, at 38 [hereinafter Pistol]; James W. Stevens, supra note 30.
33
See Let Contract for La Salle Hotel, CHI. TRIB., Mar. 3, 1908, at 11 (reporting that
Hotel La Salle Co., on whose board Charles A., James W., and Ernest J. Stevens served,
had begun work on hotel of same name).
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crusaders.34 As Europe spiraled into World War I, Ernest joined a
business leaders’ group for national defense.35 At war’s end, he threw a
“wake” to herald the onset of Prohibition in Illinois, promising, “It
will be the biggest night this town has ever known.”36 News stories
reveled in Ernest’s “war” against renegade taxi drivers, recounted how
he “made hay” by challenging competitors to join him in slashing food
and room prices, and reported that the “nifty madrigal” he had written
was performed “in the hotel dining room and was applauded by
guests.”37
Less than a fortnight after the seventh birthday of John, the
youngest of Ernest’s four sons, the family opened the Stevens Hotel.38
A photograph made at the gala shows John in a tweed jacket and plus
fours, standing before a print of the hotel that is as tall as he is. Behind
him, in ascending order according to height, stand his three brothers.
Flanking the other side of the flower-framed print are their father and
grandfather, in white tie and tails, and their grandmother and mother,
in befeathered Jazz Age apparel.39 The family’s new hotel, which faced
Lake Michigan and occupied a full city block southeast of the Loop,
was the world’s largest and most posh.40 In its heyday, it was valued at
thirty million dollars, among the world’s most expensive commercial
buildings.41 The twenty-eight floors of the Stevens held three thousand
34
Ultimatum to Hotel Saloons Expires Today, CHI. TRIB., May 25, 1915, at 10
(quoting Ernest J. Stevens).
35
Prepare! Prepare! Prepare! Prepare!, CHI. TRIB., May 17, 1916, at 5.
36
J. Barleycorn’s Wake, Chicago’s Biggest Party, CHI. TRIB., June 9, 1919, at 19 (quoting
Ernest J. Stevens); see Headache? Some Reasons for It, CHI. TRIB., July 1, 1919, at 2.
37
Mine Host at the La Salle Wins Plaudits as Lyricist, CHI. TRIB., July 20, 1919, at
12; see also Ask Injunction of U.S. Court in Taxicab War, CHI. TRIB., Sept. 28, 1919, at 9;
Hoyne Aid Tries to Solve Row of the Taxi Men, CHI. TRIB., May 29, 1919, at 10; La Salle’s
Price Challenge Fails to Move Rivals, CHI. TRIB., Dec. 4, 1919, at 9.
38
Stevens Hotel Will Be Opened Tomorrow Night, CHI. TRIB., May 1, 1927, at 8
(noting that elder Stevenses announced plans for hotel early in 1922 and that
construction began three years later); see Al Chase, Greatest Hotel for Boul Mich, CHI.
TRIB., Mar. 3, 1922, at 1; The Stevens Is Opened, a Hotel of Superlatives, CHI. TRIB., May 3,
1927, at 5; Work to Start on New Stevens Hotel May 1st, CHI. TRIB., Feb. 8, 1925, at A11.
39
See ALLEGRINI, supra note 30, at 95 (publishing photograph described in text).
With the grandfather was his wife, Alice Bradley Stevens, whom he had married after
his 1903 divorce from John’s biological grandmother, Jessie Smith Stevens, an
outspoken woman who voiced unkind words for the Stevens Hotel venture. See
Virginia Gardner, Ex-Wife Clings to Old Home of the Stevens Family in Faded South Side
Residential Area, CHI. TRIB., Mar. 26, 1933, at 2.
40
See ALLEGRINI, supra note 30, at 89-108 (recounting history of Stevenses);
ROBERT V. ALLEGRINI & GERALDINE HEMPEL DAVIS, CHICAGO’S GRAND HOTEL: A HISTORY
OF THE HILTON CHICAGO 7-19 (2002) (same); Lane, Hotel, supra note 32 (same).
41
Famous Buildings Compared with Skyscrapers in Costs, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 13, 1929,
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rooms, as well as ballrooms and bowling lanes, a place for pets, and a
Japanese tearoom for patrons.42 (The city’s fabled winds occasionally
forced closure of the rooftop miniature golf course.)43 Carved into the
lobby’s marble columns was the Stevens family crest. The Chicago
Daily News photographed John and his brothers in the hotel’s wellappointed children’s Fairyland.44 A silhouette of the boys’ mother,
Elizabeth Street Stevens, graced the best restaurant’s best china, and
fountains featuring cherubic sculptures of the boys themselves stood
at the hotel’s grand staircase.45 The Vice President of the United States
and the President of Cuba helped open the hotel.46 Among the many
trade and professional associations that convened there was the
American Bar Association, which hosted Chief Justice Charles Evans
Hughes.47 Jazz Age luminaries flocked to the Stevens, so that young
John met Amelia Earhart, who scolded him for being out late on a
school night, and Charles Lindbergh, back from his celebrated solo
flight to Paris, who gave John a dove.48
When John was twelve, his father — a Republican who that summer
welcomed conventioneering Democrats to his hotels49 — took his
at XX3 (placing New York’s Equitable Building slightly above Stevens in value).
42
ALLEGRINI & DAVIS, supra note 40, at 16; Lane, Hotel, supra note 32.
43
ALLEGRINI, supra note 30, at 101 (including photograph of golfers); Interview
with John Paul Stevens, Assoc. Justice, U.S. Supreme Court, in Wash., D.C. (Oct. 2,
2007) [hereinafter 10/2/07 Stevens Interview] (remarking on closure).
44
See ALLEGRINI & DAVIS, supra note 40, at 13; Charles Lane, Finding Justice on a
Small Scale, WASH. POST, June 5, 2005, at D1, available at http://memory.loc.gov/
ammem/index.html (including photograph numbered DN-0086303, dated 1928, and
captioned, “Two young boys playing a[t] games, sitting at a small table in a playroom
at the Stevens Hotel”).
45
10/2/07 Stevens Interview, supra note 43 (recalling that china included not only
his mother’s silhouette but also four-line poem written by his father, who, he said,
“was very devoted to his family”); see Henry J. Bohn, The Fulfilling of a Prediction Is
Realized in the Stevens, HOTEL WORLD, May 7, 1927 (including photographs of statues
of three youngest boys); Lane, Hotel, supra note 32 (mentioning china and statues);
see also Boy’s Likeness Cast in Fountain, CHI. TRIB., Mar. 8, 1914, at 2 (including
photograph of similar statue, in Hotel La Salle’s lobby, of eldest brother).
46
ALLEGRINI & DAVIS, supra note 40, at 17; President Machado Welcomed in
Chicago, N.Y. TIMES, May 3, 1927, at 29.
47
See Chief Justice Hughes to Be Heard, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 21, 1930, at 24.
48
John Paul Stevens, Associate Justice, Supreme Court of the United States,
Biographical Data, 1992 ANN. SURV. AM. L., at lv [hereinafter Biographical Data] (listing
birthdate); Glen Elsasser, Say . . . Who Was That Bridge Life Master, Anyway?, CHI.
TRIB., Nov. 26, 1998, at 1. Stevens later became a private pilot. See Robert D.
McFadden, The President’s Choice, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 29, 1975, at 1.
49
F. Raymond Daniell, Gay Crowds Swarm in Chicago Lobbies, N.Y. TIMES, June
27, 1932, at 12 (writing that “Indiana’s delegation descended upon the Stevens” day
before convention opened).
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youngest son to see New York Governor Franklin Delano Roosevelt
accept his party’s Presidential nomination.50 In a few months,
Roosevelt returned to Chicago, where he addressed 2,500 diners at the
Stevens Hotel and took his wife Eleanor to her first professional
baseball game.51 That same week, young John Stevens, a South Sider
who rooted for the North Side’s Cubs, also ventured to Wrigley Field.
He watched as slugger Babe Ruth, with two strikes against him,
pointed to center field and then hit his most famous home run,
putting the Yankees ahead in Game Three of the 1932 World Series.52
Two years later John had a plum job working at the Century of
Progress World’s Fair, a milestone in Chicago history for Sally Rand’s
peekaboo dance at the Streets of Paris exhibit and for much more.53
Thanks to what he later termed the “unabashed policy of nepotism” of
his father, who held a food concession at the fair’s English Village,
John spent the summer in period costume “as a strolling vendor of
Banbury tarts” outside a replica of the Red Lion Inn in Colchester,
England.54 At his father’s insistence, all the waitresses were redheads
“as a mark of respect for Queen Elizabeth the First.”55 After work, the
50

See Jeffrey Rosen, The Dissenter, N.Y. TIMES MAG., Sept. 23, 2007, § 6, at 50, 54
(reporting on Justice Stevens’s recollection of speech); Letter from John Paul Stevens,
Assoc. Justice, U.S. Supreme Court, to author (July 27, 2009) (on file with author)
[hereinafter 7/27/09 Stevens Letter] (confirming “that I was present when FDR
accepted the nomination”).
51
Roosevelt Affirms Wet Plank Support, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 2, 1932, at 33.
52
See ERIC ENDERS, 1903-2004: 100 YEARS OF THE WORLD SERIES 79 (2005)
(describing game); Amann, Stevens, supra note 5, at 1580 (mentioning Stevens’s
attendance). Long afterward, Stevens threw the first pitch at the same ballpark. See
Tom Curry, Justice Stevens Is Key to High Court’s Future, MSNBC, Sept. 21, 2005,
http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/9408518/ (providing photograph of event).
53
10/2/07 Stevens Interview, supra note 43; see CHERYL R. GANZ, THE 1933
CHICAGO WORLD’S FAIR: A CENTURY OF PROGRESS 9-11 (2008) (recounting importance
of titillating acts like Rand’s fan dance to fair’s success); John Paul Stevens, The Bill of
Rights: A Century of Progress, 59 U. CHI. L. REV. 13, 15 (1992) [hereinafter Stevens,
Progress] (noting that “enormously successful” fair “brought fame to a nude dancer
named Sally Rand”). See generally ROBERT W. RYDELL, WORLD OF FAIRS: THE CENTURYOF-PROGRESS EXPOSITIONS (1993) (describing Chicago fair and its success). The
wonderment surrounding the fair was captured decades later in the play, DAVID
MAMET, THE WATER ENGINE (1977), that another Chicago native wrote about a dreamy
but doomed amateur inventor.
54
John Paul Stevens, Section 43(A) of the Shakespeare Canon of Statutory
Construction: The Beverly W. Pattishall Inaugural Lecture in Trademark Law, 1 J.
MARSHALL REV. INTELL. PROP. L. 179, 179-80 (2002) [hereinafter Stevens, Section
43(A)] (recalling not so much the taste of the tarts as the “extremely heavy” weight of
the trays they filled); English Village, Century of Progress Collection (Chicago Public
Library).
55
Stevens, Section 43(A), supra note 54, at 180 (remarking that rule was “a
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teenager could be found rapt before the stage of the Village’s replica
Globe Theatre, where Macbeth, Julius Caesar, and other works by
William Shakespeare played in repertory.56
The diversion was much needed, for the times had hit the family
hard. Even before the Stevens Hotel opened, Prohibition had been
siphoning money away from legitimate establishments and into the
thousands of illegal speakeasies scattered throughout Chicago.57 Just
two years after the opening came the Stock Market Crash of ’29 and
the Great Depression. People without jobs could scarcely afford
luxury, and the Stevens Hotel lost as much as $1.75 million in a single
year.58 A few weeks before John saw FDR at the 1932 Democratic
National Convention, both the Stevens and the La Salle hotels had
been declared insolvent and handed over to a court-appointed
receiver.59 State and federal inquiries were launched, and in January
1933, a cousin’s grand jury testimony led the State of Illinois to charge
John’s father, uncle, and grandfather with embezzling money from

flagrantly discriminatory condition of employment”).
56
10/2/07 Stevens Interview, supra note 43; Playbill, Century of Progress
Collection (Chicago Public Library). Thus began a lifelong study of the playwright.
See Amann, Stevens, supra note 5, at 1571, 1571 n.14; Stevens, Progress, supra note 53,
at 14 (calling Shakespeare “the greatest author of all time”); Jess Bravin, Justice Stevens
Renders an Opinion on Who Wrote Shakespeare’s Plays — It Wasn’t the Bard of Avon He
Says; “Evidence Is Beyond a Reasonable Doubt,” WALL ST. J., Apr. 18, 2009, at A1.
57
NATHAN MILLER, NEW WORLD COMING: THE 1920S AND THE MAKING OF MODERN
AMERICA 302 (2003) (citing estimates of 10,000 or more Chicago speakeasies);
10/2/07 Stevens Interview, supra note 43. A decade after holding a wet “wake” at the
Hotel La Salle, Ernest J. Stevens tried to ban soft drinks lest he be liable for violating
Prohibition should a guest use them to mix cocktails; however, “law-abiding” guests
rebelled. Hotel Rescinds Ban on Ginger Ale in Room, N.Y. TIMES, May 26, 1929, at 25;
see supra text accompanying note 36. His son would mention this era decades later in
Granholm v. Heald, 544 U.S. 460, 496 (2005) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (describing his
“understanding (and recollection) of the historical context” of amendment that ended
Prohibition, time when “millions of Americans” did not consider “alcohol . . . an
ordinary article of commerce,” but rather “condemned the use of the ‘demon rum’ ”).
58
See Stevens Hotel Co., WALL ST. J., May 30, 1932, at 3 (reporting net loss of
$1,759,971 in 1931, more than $700,000 greater than previous year); Stevens Hotel
Co., WALL ST. J., Nov. 24, 1933, at 6; Stevens Hotel Co., WALL ST. J., Apr. 9, 1930, at 5
(reporting losses of nearly $1 million in 1928, and about half that in 1929). It turned a
profit after it entered receivership — in 1933, the first year of the Century of Progress
World’s Fair. See description supra text accompanying notes 52-55 and infra text
accompanying note 71.
59
Receiver Named for Stevens and La Salle Hotels, CHI. TRIB., June 4, 1932, at 3. The
department store owned by the family since the 1800s had endured a similar fate
earlier in the year. C. A. Stevens & Bros. Go into Receivership, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 30, 1932,
at 29; see also Charles A. Stevens, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 25, 1932 (reporting on death later
that year of store’s founder, the Justice’s great-uncle).
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their insurance company in an unsuccessful attempt to keep the hotels
afloat.60 A banner on the front page of the Chicago Daily Tribune blared
Ernest’s arrest.61 The back page featured two photos: in one, Ernest is
walking down the steps of his home in the custody of two taller,
fedora-topped detectives; in another, he is being booked at the
downtown police bureau.62 Though Ernest was freed on bond, he and
his family would not be free of the case for years.
Scarcely two weeks after media publication of the Stevens’s address,
gunmen dressed as police pushed their way into the home and
demanded money from Ernest, Elizabeth, and the Stevens boys.63 The
robbers cut the telephone wires and ransacked the house.64 At one
point they lined the entire family up against a wall and said they
would “mow” everyone down “if you don’t tell us where the money
is.”65 Finding a combination safe in John’s bedroom, they forced him
to unlock it. He did. As Stevens later recalled, the safe held “cash
(which they took) and some gold pieces that were concealed in my
diary (which they did not take).”66
In the months that followed, John’s grandfather, the formidable
J.W., was felled by a stroke, and his Uncle Raymond, reportedly
“despondent over his financial troubles and the grave illness of his
father,” committed suicide.67 John’s father thus stood trial alone, and
after five hours of deliberation on October 14, 1933, jurors found
Ernest J. Stevens guilty of embezzling $1,308,463.68 He remained on
60

See 3 in Illinois Life Indicted in Crash, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 31, 1933, at 14 (reporting
that among those who testified before grand jury was “Bert J. Stookey, former director
of the insurance company and a nephew of James W. Stevens”).
61
Hold E.J. Stevens for Fraud, CHI. TRIB., Jan. 28, 1933, at 1 [hereinafter Hold]; see
Ask Indictment Tomorrow of 3 Stevenses, CHI. TRIB., Jan. 29, 1933, at 1.
62
See Hold, supra note 61 (publishing photos captioned “E. J. Stevens Arrested on
Warrant Charging Fraud Conspiracy” and “Insurance Company Official Booked and
Released on $10,000 Bond”).
63
See E. J. Stevens Family Robbed in Chicago, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 15, 1933, at 7
[hereinafter Robbed] (indicating that robbery had occurred on the previous Saturday,
Feb. 11); see also Hold, supra note 61 (stating address in second paragraph of lead
article on page one).
64
Robbed, supra note 63; 10/2/07 Stevens Interview, supra note 43.
65
10/2/07 Stevens Interview, supra note 43 (quoting robber).
66
7/27/09 Stevens Letter, supra note 50; 10/2/07 Stevens Interview, supra note 43;
see Lane, Hotel, supra note 32.
67
Pistol, supra note 32; see R. W. Stevens Ends Own Life, CHI. TRIB., Mar. 24, 1933,
at 1. The grandfather would die three years later. James W. Stevens, supra note 30.
68
E. J. Stevens Found Guilty of Theft, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 15, 1933, at 30; Jury Convicts
Ernest J. Stevens, CHI. TRIB., Oct. 15, 1933, at 1. Ernest’s testimony in his own defense
had failed to sway jurors in his favor. Stevens Paints Rosy Business Vision for Jury, CHI.
TRIB., Oct. 13, 1933, at 1.
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bail pending appeal of his conviction and sentence of one to ten years
in prison.69 The next October, a seven-page judgment of the Illinois
Supreme Court fully and unanimously exonerated John’s father.70 “We
are not commending the loans to the hotel company as sound
investment,” the opinion stated, and then continued: “It is a far cry
from a mistake in investment made in good faith to a felonious,
fraudulent investment made for the purpose of converting the funds of
the lender to the use of the accused. There is here no evidence of
fraudulent intent.”71 Therefore, the state’s seven justices concluded,
“We are of the opinion that the record does not justify the verdict of
guilty.”72 Later that month, the Century of Progress World’s Fair, and
with it Ernest J. Stevens’s Red Lion Inn, closed for the last time.73
Throughout the family turmoil of his teen years, John applied
himself to his studies. Moving from the University of Chicago
Laboratory School to the university itself, he listened as two
professors, the renowned scholars Mortimer Adler and Robert
Hutchins, debated whether the United States should come to the aid of
England in its fight against Nazi Germany.74 He was graduated Phi
Beta Kappa and began postgraduate work in English. At a dean’s
urging, Stevens took up the study of cryptography; that learning led
him away from the study of literature, toward a global armed conflict,
and eventually, into a career in the law.75
The career continues. In 2009 Stevens completed his thirty-third full
Term. He is the second-oldest Justice ever to serve on the Supreme
Court.76 He had begun a half-decade of service as a federal appellate
judge in Chicago in 1970, one year after leading a special corruption
investigation that forced the resignation of two Justices of the Illinois

69

E. J. Stevens Sentenced, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 28, 1933, at 5.
People v. Stevens, 193 N.E. 154 (Ill. 1934). The decision was rendered on October
22, 1934; the reversal of conviction became final on December 13 of the same year,
when the Illinois Supreme Court denied the state’s petition for rehearing. Id. at 154.
71
Id. at 160.
72
Id.
73
See Great Fair Will End Tonight, CHI. TRIB., Oct. 31, 1934, at 1.
74
See John Paul Stevens, Learning on the Job, 74 FORDHAM L. REV. 1561, 1561
(2006) [hereinafter Stevens, Learning].
75
See MANASTER, supra note 26, at 38; Biographical Data, supra note 48, at lv.
76
Family and Dignitaries See Stevens Join Court, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 20, 1975, at 25
(describing swearing-in ceremony from day before); Mark Sherman, Another Justice
Sits out Another Case, FOXNEWS.COM, Apr. 23, 2008, http://www.usatoday.com/news/
washington/2008-04-23-1641911495_x.htm (naming Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr.,
who “was 56 days shy of his 91st birthday when he retired,” the oldest).
70
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Supreme Court.77 That high-profile assignment capped twenty-two
years in the practice, most of them as a name partner in the litigation
firm of Rothschild, Stevens, Barry & Myers.78 Cases included a
successful constitutional challenge to a state-imposed divorce delay, a
tort suit filed for an injured college football star, and a pro bono
victory on behalf of a defendant convicted of murder.79 Stevens earned
a reputation for antitrust expertise: he argued one antitrust case before
the U.S. Supreme Court, taught antitrust as an adjunct law professor at
Northwestern and Chicago, analyzed antitrust in professional baseball
for a congressional subcommittee, and was a member of the Attorney
General’s National Committee to Study the Antitrust Laws.80 Stevens’s
own law studies had sparked his interest in the subject; indeed,
Stanley L. Temko, Stevens’s co-clerk in the Rutledge chambers,
distinctly remembered the delight Stevens took in his work on an
antitrust case during his year as a Supreme Court clerk.81
Antitrust was by no means the only issue on the docket for October
Term 1947, however. National security questions loomed large as the
end of World War II gave way to the birth of the Cold War.82 Scrutiny
77
2 Illinoisans O.K.’d as Judges by Senate, CHI. TRIB., Oct. 9, 1970, at 8. The inquiry
and its aftermath are detailed in MANASTER, supra note 26.
78
See Amann, Stevens, supra note 5, at 1592-93 (describing Stevens’s postclerkship position as associate in Chicago firm now called Jenner & Block); People and
Events, CHI. TRIB., July 18, 1952, at B7 (announcing opening of firm).
79
See Johnson Kanady, Rules Divorce “Cooling Off” Law Invalid, CHI. TRIB., Mar.
18, 1954, at 7 (reporting on People ex rel. Christiansen v. Connell, 118 N.E.2d 262
(Ill. App. Ct. 1954)); William O’Connor of Notre Dame Sues All-Star Sponsors, CHI.
TRIB., Aug. 2, 1949, at A4; infra text accompanying notes 209-13 (discussing People v.
La Frana, 122 N.E.2d 583, 583 (Ill. 1954)).
80
See United States v. Borden Co., 370 U.S. 460, 460 (1962) (naming Stevens as
advocate for respondent Bowman Dairy Co. in unsuccessful effort to persuade Court
to affirm dismissal below of federal antitrust action); Biographical Data, supra note 48,
at lv; McFadden, supra note 48; see also John Paul Stevens, Random Recollections, 42
SAN DIEGO L. REV. 269, 270 (2005) [hereinafter Stevens, Random] (recalling 1953
antitrust committee); John Paul Stevens, Tom Fairchild: Friend and Colleague, 2007
WIS. L. REV. 43, 43 n.2 (referring to work on 1952 subcommittee).
81
Interview with Stanley L. Temko, Esq. in Wash., D.C. (Oct. 1, 2007)
[hereinafter 10/1/07 Temko Interview].
82
Amann, Stevens, supra note 5, at 1586-99 (discussing national security and
Rutledge period); see also Craig Green, Wiley Rutledge, Executive Detention, and Judicial
Conscience at War, 84 WASH. U. L. REV. 99, 113-76 (2006) (providing further analysis,
with particular reference to JOHN M. FERREN, SALT OF THE EARTH, CONSCIENCE OF THE
COURT: THE STORY OF JUSTICE WILEY RUTLEDGE (2004)); Laura Krugman Ray, Clerk and
Justice: The Ties that Bind John Paul Stevens and Wiley B. Rutledge, 41 CONN. L. REV.
211, 233, 243-46, 257-60 (2008). See generally Joseph T. Thai, The Law Clerk Who
Wrote Rasul v. Bush: John Paul Stevens’s Influence from World War II to the War on
Terror, 92 VA. L. REV. 501 (2006).
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of how states administered criminal justice continued.83 In point of
fact, the Court gave close scrutiny to many aspects of life in postwar
America. One of the Rutledge clerks’ first assignments involved the
case of J.D. and Ethel Shelley, a Missouri couple against whom white
neighbors had invoked a private covenant barring “people of the
Negro or Mongolian Race.”84 “Rutledge very much wanted to be sure
he could participate. But he had a restrictive covenant on his house,”
Stevens recalled. “He must have felt the decision might have gone the
other way.”85 Stevens and his co-clerk thus were dispatched to the
local records office to find a way for Rutledge to sit on the case; in the
end, Rutledge joined two others in recusal but the remainder of the
Court ruled unanimously for the Shelleys.86 Another case that
animated Rutledge involved Fred Oyama, a California-born boy whom
the state sought to deprive of farmland just because of his Japanese
ancestry.87 Rutledge joined a concurrence that said the state’s action
did “violence to the high ideals of the Constitution of the United
States and the Charter of the United Nations,” stood as “an unhappy
facsimile, a disheartening reminder, of the racial policy pursued by
those forces of evil whose destruction recently necessitated a
devastating war,” and thus constituted “racism in one of its most
malignant forms.”88 Also in this line was the case of Ada Lois Sipuel,
the young woman who the Court said could not be excluded from
Oklahoma’s public law school just because of her African ancestry.89
83
See, e.g., Marino v. Ragen, 332 U.S. 561 (1947) (per curiam) (reversing murder
conviction on account of Illinois’s flawed postconviction relief process). For further
discussion, see In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257, 258, 278 (1948) (reversing contempt
conviction summarily imposed by Michigan judge acting as “one-man grand jury”);
Amann, Stevens, supra note 5, at 1590-93.
84
Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 5 (1948) (quoting covenant); see LORENZO
JOHNSTON GREENE ET AL., MISSOURI’S BLACK HERITAGE 163-65 (rev. ed. 1993)
(discussing Shelleys).
85
Interview with John Paul Stevens, Assoc. Justice, U.S. Supreme Court, in Wash.,
D.C. (Mar. 29, 2007) [hereinafter 3/29/07 Stevens Interview].
86
Id.; see Shelley, 334 U.S. at 23 (noting that Justice Rutledge, along with Justices
Stanley Reed and Robert H. Jackson, did not participate); see also Hurd v. Hodge, 334
U.S. 24, 35 (1948) (same in companion case involving District of Columbia).
Rutledge’s legacy in the matter is mixed; as Stevens’s co-clerk pointed out, the Justice
had purchased a home with such a covenant even though unencumbered housing
could be had in other neighborhoods. 10/1/07 Temko Interview, supra note 81.
87
Oyama v. California, 332 U.S. 633 (1948).
88
Id. at 673 (Murphy, J., concurring, joined by Rutledge, J.); see id. at 640
(majority opinion) (Vinson, C.J.) (holding that state’s application of its Alien Land
Law deprived petitioner, a child born in the United States to Japanese citizens, “of the
equal protection of California’s laws and of his privileges as an American citizen”).
89
See supra text accompanying notes 1-9 (discussing Sipuel litigation).
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Matters like these demanded careful consideration of the
Constitution’s equality principle — a principle that one clerk, John
Paul Stevens, would consider anew as a member of the Court.
II.

A JURISPRUDENCE OF EQUALITY

To detail every one of Stevens’s judicial opinions on equality would
consume volumes, and this Article attempts nothing of the sort. Nor
does it try to replicate more comprehensive studies of Justice Stevens’s
treatment of the Equal Protection Clause.90 Rather, in this Part, this
Article discusses a select few opinions in order to track what Stevens
once called a “tortuous” path of jurisprudence respecting equality.91
By the time John Paul Stevens arrived at the Supreme Court in 1975,
the rule against de jure racial segregation was entrenched. Expounding
on a view like that which Stevens advanced confidentially in his 1948
clerk’s memorandum,92 the Court in 1954 had unanimously
proclaimed that all state-mandated segregation is “inherently
unequal,” in violation not only of the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment, but also of the equal protection component
subsumed within the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment.93
90
E.g., Daniel A. Farber, Backward-Looking Laws and Equal Protection: The Case of
Black Reparations, 74 FORDHAM L. REV. 2271 (2006); James E. Fleming, “There Is Only
One Equal Protection Clause”: An Appreciation of Justice Stevens’s Equal Protection
Jurisprudence, 74 FORDHAM L. REV. 2301 (2006); Andrew M. Siegel, Equal Protection
Unmodified: Justice John Paul Stevens and the Case for Unmediated Constitutional
Interpretation, 74 FORDHAM L. REV. 2393 (2006); Siegel, supra note 13, at 929-37;
Note, Justice Stevens’ Equal Protection Jurisprudence, 100 HARV. L. REV. 1146 (1987).
91
Wygant v. Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 314 n.7 (Stevens, J., dissenting). As did
Stevens’s reference, the path followed in this Article primarily concerns affirmative
action programs; for reasons of space, the Article does not explore Justice Stevens’s
treatment of equality, race, and the law in areas such as criminal justice, one example
of which may be found in McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 366-67 (1987) (Stevens,
J., joined by Blackmun, J.). Nor does it examine in any depth treatment of groups
other than African Americans, an omission made particularly obvious by the 2009
arrival of Sonia Sotomayor as the Court’s first Latina Justice. See Jeff Bleich et al.,
Justice John Paul Stevens: A Maverick, Liberal, Libertarian, Conservative Statesmen on the
Court, OR. ST. B. BULL., Oct. 2007, at 26 (writing “that the ‘Stevens standard’ ”
respecting the Equal Protection Clause “has proven to be very sensitive to claims of
discrimination as the role of women in society has changed”); David G. Savage,
Sotomayor Is Sworn in as a Justice, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 9, 2009, at 3; John Paul Stevens,
Opening Assembly Address, American Bar Association Annual Meeting, Orlando, Florida,
August 3, 1996, 2 ST. JOHN’S J. LEGAL COMMENT. 21, 23-24 (1996) (touching on his
jurisprudence respecting women).
92
JPS Fisher Mem., supra note 5.
93
Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 494-95 (1954) (interpreting, in case
challenging state-governed public schools, U.S. CONST. amend. XIV (“nor shall any
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Although communities across the country continued to resist the
consequent order to desegregate with “all deliberate speed,”94 the
Court itself remained in agreement that desegregation must be
dismantled, even by measures as controversial as the busing of
children to achieve integration of schools once subjected to de jure
segregation.95
A. Fullilove v. Klutznick
There was no agreement, however, on what some called “affirmative
action” and others called “reverse discrimination”;96 that is, on
measures aimed at giving minorities access to sectors from which they
were excluded even in the absence of state-mandated segregation. A
salient example involved a 1978 challenge to race-based admissions
quotas then used at the University of California, Davis, School of
Medicine.97 Rather than broach whether the Constitution forbade such
quotas, Stevens and three other Justices had preferred to rest their
decision on statutory grounds.98 Thus, it was not until the 1980 case of
Fullilove v. Klutznick that all nine Justices squarely confronted the
constitutionality of affirmative action.99
State . . . deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws”),
to require express overruling of approval of de jure segregation of “equal but separate”
facilities in Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 540 (1896) (quoting Louisiana statute
under review)); Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 499-500 (1954) (stating in
companion case to Brown that “the concepts of equal protection and due process . . .
are not mutually exclusive,” and holding that segregation of federally governed
schools in Washington, D.C., violated U.S. CONST. amend. V (“No person shall be . . .
deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law”)).
94
Brown v. Bd. of Educ. (Brown II), 349 U.S. 294, 301 (1955). On resistance, see
generally Mary L. Dudziak, The Little Rock Crisis and Foreign Affairs: Race, Resistance,
and the Image of American Democracy, 70 S. CAL. L. REV. 1641 (1997); Michael J.
Klarman, Brown at 50, 90 VA. L. REV. 1613 (2004); Kevin M. Kruse, The Paradox of
Massive Resistance: Political Conformity and Chaos in the Aftermath of Brown v. Board of
Education, 48 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 1009 (2004).
95
See Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 30 (1971)
(approving busing remedy in unanimous decision).
96
See Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 413 (1978) (Stevens, J.,
concurring in judgment in part and dissenting in part) (referring disjunctively to both
terms).
97
Bakke, 438 U.S. at 265.
98
See id. at 408-21 (Stevens, J., concurring in judgment in part and dissenting in
part, joined by Burger, C.J., Stewart & Rehnquist, JJ.). The rest of the Court divided
on how to interpret the Constitution in the instant case. See id. at 269-324 (majority
opinion) (Powell, J.); id. at 324-408 (Brennan, J., concurring in judgment in part and
dissenting in part, joined by White, Marshall & Blackmun, JJ.).
99
Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448 (1980).

2010]

John Paul Stevens and Equally Impartial Government

903

H. Earl Fullilove, a white man from New York, and other
contractors had objected to a 1977 statute requiring state and local
governments to set aside ten percent of four billion dollars in federal
public works funds for “minority business enterprises,” firms in which
at least fifty-one percent of stock was held by “citizens of the United
States who are Negroes, Spanish-speaking, Orientals, Indians,
Eskimos, and Aleuts.”100 A fractured majority of the Court concluded
that the Constitution permitted Congress “to accomplish the objective
of remedying the present effects of past discrimination” by such
means.101 Three Justices disagreed. The dissent of Justices Potter
Stewart and William H. Rehnquist declared, “Our Constitution is
color-blind, and neither knows nor tolerates classes among
citizens.”102 Thus having seized the mantle of the Justice whose lone
opposition to a separate-but-equal law in 1896 was vindicated by the
full Court in 1954, they posited a doctrine of equality according to
which Congress’s race-conscious set-aside statute was no different
from the race-based separate-but-equal statutes that the Court had
outlawed in Brown.103
Stevens’s solo dissent in Fullilove started with a quite different
framing of the provision, as a gift of “monopoly privileges in a $400
million market for a class of investors defined solely by racial
characteristics.”104 A sovereign’s monopoly grant typically spawned
“high prices and shoddy workmanship” as well as “animosity and
discontent,” and the program under review invited those problems, he
100
Public Works Employment Act of 1977, § 1093(f)(2), Pub. L. 95-28, 91 Stat.
116 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 6705(f)(2) (Supp. II 1976)), quoted in Fullilove, 448 U.S.
at 453-54; see TERRY H. ANDERSON, THE PURSUIT OF FAIRNESS: A HISTORY OF AFFIRMATIVE
ACTION 157 (2004) (describing petitioner Fullilove).
101
Fullilove, 448 U.S. at 470 (plurality opinion) (Burger, C.J., joined by White &
Powell, JJ.); see id. at 495-517 (Powell, J., concurring) (agreeing with judgment but
calling for clearer standard of review). Three Justices agreed “that the consideration of
race is relevant to remedying the continuing effects of past racial discrimination,” but
argued that something less than the strictest level of scrutiny ought to apply. Id. at
517-22 (Marshall, J., concurring in judgment, joined by Brennan & Blackmun, JJ.).
102
Id. at 522 (Stewart, J., dissenting, joined by Rehnquist, J.) (quoting Plessy v.
Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 559 (1896) (Harlan, J., dissenting)).
103
See id. at 523-33 (Stewart, J., dissenting, joined by Rehnquist, J.).
104
Id. at 532 (Stevens, J., dissenting). On the Justice’s penchant for writing
separately, see Amann, Stevens, supra note 5, at 1575 (referring to experience as
special investigator into Illinois Supreme Court corruption); see also Justice John Paul
Stevens, Assoc. Justice, U.S. Supreme Court, Remarks at the Ninth Circuit Judicial
Conference, Honolulu, Haw. (July 19, 2007) (recalling same investigation, and stating
that “I think the public is entitled to know when the Court is not unanimous and
when there are arguments for the other side,” so that “if I don’t agree with the
majority, I think I have an obligation to explain that I don’t agree and explain why”).
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wrote.105 Stevens had entertained the Stewart-Rehnquist notion of
“color-blindness” when interpreting a civil rights statute two years
earlier.106 But in Fullilove he parted company with those other
dissenters on this point; he stated that he was “not convinced” that the
Constitution absolutely forbids classifications based on race.107
Recalling an account of “tragic class-based discrimination” given by
Thurgood Marshall, a member of the Court since 1967, Stevens wrote,
“I assume that the wrong” done to African Americans “would
constitutionally justify an appropriate classwide recovery.”108 In
Stevens’s view, however, the instant program did not provide a
properly tailored remedy for past discrimination.109 Nor did it help
with “facilitating and encouraging the participation by minority
business enterprises in the economy,” an interest Stevens deemed
“unquestionably legitimate.”110
Even as he allowed in Fullilove that some race-conscious programs
might be permissible, Stevens evinced much discomfort. He found
similarity between the basing of grants on race, a trait acquired at
birth, and the bestowing of “titles of nobility,” the latter expressly
prohibited by the Constitution.111 At risk were both the promise that
all are “ ‘created equal’ in the eyes of the law” and “our commitment to
the proposition that the sovereign has a fundamental duty to govern
impartially.”112 Race-based classifications not only are irrational, but
also may harm “the entire body politic,” Stevens warned.113 “If the
National Government is to make a serious effort to define racial classes
by criteria that can be administered objectively, it must study
precedents such as the First Regulation to the Reichs Citizenship

105

Fullilove, 448 U.S. at 532-33, 545 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 415-16, 415 n.16, 416 n.19
(1978) (Stevens, J., concurring in judgment in part and dissenting in part, joined by
Burger, C.J., Stewart & Rehnquist, JJ.) (identifying mentions of “colorblind” purpose
in legislative history, including one that embraced declaration in Plessy v. Ferguson,
163 U.S. 537, 559 (1896) (Harlan, J., dissenting)).
107
Fullilove, 448 U.S. at 548 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
108
Id. at 537 (citing Bakke, 438 U.S. at 387 (opinion of Marshall, J.)); see Juan
Williams, Marshall’s Law, in MARSHALL, supra note 2, at 140, 154-55 (describing
circumstances of Marshall’s 1967 elevation to Supreme Court).
109
Fullilove, 448 U.S. at 537-39 (Stevens, J., dissenting); see id. at 544 (“At best, the
preference for minority business enterprises is a crude and inadequate response to the
evils that flow from discriminatory lending practices.”).
110
Id. at 542-43.
111
Id. at 533, 533 n.1 (citing U.S. CONST., art. I, § 9, cl. 8).
112
Id. at 533 (quoting Declaration of Independence).
113
Id. at 533-34.
106
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Law,” he wrote, and then quoted at length references to blood and
race in that Nazi statute’s definitions of who in Germany was a Jew.114
Having summoned that loathsome antecedent, Stevens next attacked
the definition of who in the United States was entitled to the set-aside
grant. Congress had not keyed eligibility to geography or other
criteria, he noted, so that someone whose group likely had not
suffered discrimination in a particular area — say, “a citizen of Eskimo
ancestry . . . in Miami” — nonetheless could benefit.115 In the
legislative history, Stevens found no explanation of how eligible
groups came to be included, how all groups came to share equally
notwithstanding their different histories, or how one-tenth rather than
any other fraction of total funds came to be allotted.116 What he did
find was evidence of “political patronage,” that is, “that there is a
group of legislators in Congress identified as the ‘Black Caucus’ ”
which contended that “their constituents were entitled to ‘a piece of
the action.’ ”117
B. Wygant v. Jackson Board of Education
Even as the judgment in Fullilove issued in 1980, a new dispute was
taking shape. The next year, the school board in Jackson, Michigan,
faced with a need to reduce its work force, laid off teachers according
to a formula that gave some preference to minority over seniority
status.118 Pink-slipped kindergarten teacher Wendy Wygant and seven
others sued.119 Another fractured majority decided this challenge to
affirmative action; however, in this 1986 judgment the Court agreed
with the white petitioners and held that that the formula violated the
Equal Protection Clause.120 The principal opinion criticized both of
114
Id. at 534 n.5 (quoting First Regulation to Reichs Citizenship Law of Nov. 14,
1935, translated in 4 NAZI CONSPIRACY AND AGGRESSION, Doc. No. 1417-PS, at 8-9
(1946)).
115
Id. at 546; see also id. at 537 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“Quite obviously, the
history of discrimination against black citizens in America cannot justify a grant of
privileges to Eskimos or Indians.”).
116
Id. at 535-36.
117
Id. at 541-42.
118
See Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 270-72 (1986) (detailing
prior litigation over formula adopted, “because of racial tension,” in 1972 collective
bargaining agreement).
119
ANDERSON, supra note 100, at 190 (describing petitioner Wygant).
120
Wygant, 476 U.S. at 269-84 (plurality opinion) (Powell, J., joined by Burger,
C.J., and O’Connor, J.) (concluding that layoff provision was not tailored narrowly
enough); id. at 284-94 (O’Connor, J., concurring in part in judgment) (arriving at
similar conclusion by somewhat different analysis); id. at 294-95 (White, J.,
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the interests the school board asserted: the first, that of “providing
minority role models for its minority students, as an attempt to
alleviate the effects of societal discrimination,” was judged “too
amorphous”; and the second, “to remedy prior discrimination,” was
said to fail for lack of “sufficient evidence to justify the conclusion that
there has been prior discrimination.”121 Yet in the end, the validity of
either interest mattered little because the means chosen — laying off
senior, nonminority teachers in order to keep less senior, minority
teachers — could never satisfy the Constitution.122 The principal
opinion stated, “Racial classifications are simply too pernicious to
permit any but the most exact connection between justification and
classification.”123 In so doing, it directly quoted Stevens’s dissent in
Fullilove.
Stevens, however, reached a different result. He too quoted his
dissent in Fullilove, reiterating that the Court has “a special obligation”
to ensure that race-conscious classifications both served “a valid
public purpose” that “transcends the harm,” and were the product of
“procedural safeguards” that “play a vital part in preserving the
impartial character of the legislative process.”124 Yet in Wygant, unlike
in Fullilove, Stevens concluded that the program met these
requirements.125 In Wygant he did restate the view that in many
situations — in awarding child custody, for example — governmental
consideration of race is “utterly irrational” and even “pernicious.”126
But he stressed that this need not always be so.127 The layoff formula
concurring in judgment) (rejecting notion that any program endeavoring to “maintain
a certain proportion of minority teachers” by discharging nonminorities ever could be
constitutional).
121
Id. at 275-77 (plurality opinion).
122
Id. at 278 (stating that “we need not consider the question” of sufficiency of
evidence because “the layoff provision was not a legally appropriate means of
achieving even a compelling purpose”).
123
Id. at 280 (quoting Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 537 (1980) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting)).
124
Id. at 314, 317 n.10 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (quoting Fullilove, 448 U.S. at 54849 (Stevens, J., dissenting)).
125
See id. at 315-19. Three other Justices agreed that school officials had acted
constitutionally. Id. at 295-312 (Marshall, J., dissenting, joined by Brennan &
Blackmun, JJ.).
126
Id. at 313-14 n.6, 317, 317 n.9 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (quoting Cleburne v.
Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 452 (1985) (Stevens, J., concurring in judgment)
(“utterly irrational”), and citing Palmore v. Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429 (1984) (holding, in
litigation further discussed infra note 239, that effects of racial discrimination could
not justify depriving white divorcée living with African-American man custody of her
daughter)); see Fullilove, 448 U.S. at 537 (Stevens, J. dissenting) (“pernicious”).
127
See Wygant, 476 U.S. at 314, 314 n.7 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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under review was valid, Stevens wrote, regardless of whether the
school board had discriminated in the past.128 What mattered was the
future: whether the board “has a legitimate interest in employing more
black teachers in the future,” that is, whether the layoff formula
“advances the public interest in educating children for the future.”129
For Stevens, the answer was clear:
[O]ne of the most important lessons that the American public
schools teach is that the diverse ethnic, cultural, and national
backgrounds that have been brought together in our famous
“melting pot” do not identify essential differences among the
human beings that inhabit our land. It is one thing for a white
child to be taught by a white teacher that color, like beauty, is
only “skin deep”; it is far more convincing to experience that
truth on a day-to-day basis during the routine, ongoing
learning process.130
Stevens advanced two reasons why the “grave loss” Wygant and other
laid-off teachers had suffered did not render the formula
unconstitutional.131 First, the formula was the product of a
procedurally fair bargaining process between the school board and the
union that represented all teachers.132 Second, the harm to the white
petitioners was based on economic conditions and the desire “to
preserve the newly integrated character of the faculty,” and not “on
any lack of respect for their race, or on blind habit and stereotype.”133
That the formula aimed to include — to assure a cross-section of
groups in the faculty — was pivotal. No less than if a police chief “in a
city with a recent history of racial unrest” decided “that an integrated
police force could develop a better relationship with the community
and thereby do a more effective job,” the decision of the school board
to maintain an integrated teaching staff was “consistent with the
principle that all men are created equal,” Stevens wrote.134

128
See id. at 313 (declining to “as[k] whether minority teachers have some sort of
special entitlement to jobs as a remedy for sins that were committed in the past”).
129
Id.
130
Id. at 315.
131
See id. at 318.
132
Id. at 317-18.
133
Id. at 319.
134
Id. at 314, 316; see id. at 316-17 (positing difference between “inclusionary” and
“exclusionary” measures).
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C. Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Peña
Stevens’s subsequent applications of that principle varied. Three
years after expressing approval in Wygant for a layoff formula
advantaging minority teachers, Stevens joined a Court majority that
struck as unlawful racial discrimination a city plan reserving thirty
percent of contract dollars for minority contractors.135 Then, the
following year, he joined a majority that upheld a federal program
designed to achieve what Stevens termed the “future benefit” of
promoting diversity by reserving some broadcast licenses for minority
firms.136 Five years later, in his 1995 dissent in Adarand Constructors,
Inc. v. Peña, Stevens professed to welcome a majority’s embrace of the
“skepticism” he had voiced in Fullilove, even as he rejected its use of
his earlier opinion in order to establish strict scrutiny as the single
standard for reviewing race-conscious programs.137 Averring that the
federal affirmative action program in Adarand Constructors was
constitutional, Stevens took the majority to task for equating “a
decision by the majority to impose a special burden on the members of
a minority race” with one “to provide a benefit to certain members of
that minority notwithstanding its incidental burden on some members
of the majority.”138 In his mind the two were patently different:
Invidious discrimination is an engine of oppression,
subjugating a disfavored group to enhance or maintain the
power of the majority. Remedial race-based preferences reflect
the opposite impulse: a desire to foster equality in society. No
sensible conception of the Government’s constitutional

135
City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 511-18 (1989) (Stevens, J.,
concurring in part and in judgment).
136
Metro Broad. v. FCC, 497 U.S. 547, 601 (1990). Stevens further endorsed a
colleague’s statement, which he had not joined when it was written, that promoting
diversity in professional schools was a valid public reason for engaging in affirmative
action. See id. at 602, 602 n.6 (Stevens, J., concurring) (citing Regents of Univ. of Cal.
v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 311-19 (1978) (opinion of Powell, J.)). The endorsement
presaged Stevens’s vote in favor of a race-conscious admissions program at the
University of Michigan. See Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003) (approving law
school plan aimed at attaining diverse student body); cf. Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S.
244, 282-91 (2003) (Stevens, J., dissenting, joined by Souter, J.) (arguing that Court
should have dismissed challenge to university’s undergraduate admissions plan for
lack of standing).
137
Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Peña, 515 U.S. 200, 242 (1995) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting, joined by Ginsburg, J.).
138
Id. at 243; see id. at 259-64 (explaining reasons for concluding program was
constitutional).
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obligation to “govern impartially” should ignore this
distinction.139
Stevens would emphasize that distinction again a dozen years later.
D. Parents Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle School District
No. 1
As in Brown, the matter here called Seattle Schools in fact concerned
more than one of America’s public school districts: at issue were pupilassignment plans designed to avoid resegregation in two systems,
Seattle, Washington, and Louisville, Kentucky.140 The mother of
Joshua Ryan McDonald had sued after school officials refused to let
the boy attend kindergarten a mile from his Louisville home, out of
fear of “ ‘an adverse effect on desegregation compliance’ ” in his
assigned school ten miles away.141 Young Joshua’s plight drew the
Court’s attention. “The district concedes it denied his request under
the guidelines, which is to say, on the basis of Joshua’s race,” Justice
Anthony M. Kennedy wrote in a partial concurrence explaining why
he considered both systems’ plans unconstitutional.142 Although the
principal opinion also discussed Joshua, Kennedy declined to join a
portion of it that he called “inconsistent in both its approach and its
implications with the history, meaning, and reach of the Equal
Protection Clause.”143 Thus did Kennedy retreat from this passage by
Chief Justice John G. Roberts, Jr.:
Before Brown, schoolchildren were told where they could and
could not go to school based on the color of their skin. The
school districts in these cases have not carried the heavy
139

Id. at 243 (quoting but omitting citation to Hampton v. Mow Sun Wong, 426
U.S. 88, 100 (1976)).
140
Seattle Schools, 551 U.S. 701, 709-11 (2007) (including in caption companion
suit against Louisville’s Jefferson County Board of Education); see Bolling v. Sharpe,
347 U.S. 497, 500 (1954) (applying in additional companion case holding in Brown to
federally run schools); Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954) (listing
consolidated cases from several states’ school systems).
141
Seattle Schools, 551 U.S. at 717 (majority opinion) (Roberts, C.J.) (quoting
record below). As a case that “illustrated” the complaint of the organization that had
brought suit in Seattle, the principal opinion likewise told of dyslexic and hyperactive
ninth-grader Andy Meeks, who had been denied assignment to the high school his
mother believed best-suited to his needs. Id. at 713-14.
142
Id. at 784 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and in judgment).
143
Id. at 782-83 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and in judgment); see id. at 717,
717 n.8, 719-20 (majority opinion) (Roberts, C.J.) (mentioning Joshua); id. at 728
(plurality opinion) (Roberts, C.J., joined by Scalia, Thomas & Alito, JJ.) (same).
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burden of demonstrating that we should allow this once again
even for very different reasons. . . . The way to stop
discrimination on the basis of race is to stop discriminating on
the basis of race.144
In dissent Stevens deployed words more pointed than those in
Kennedy’s delicate sidestep. Stevens criticized the use of strict scrutiny
to invalidate programs that in his view furthered “the public interest
in educating children for the future,” in a setting by which “children of
all races benefit from integrated classrooms and playgrounds.”145 Such
usage effected “a wooden reading of the Equal Protection Clause,” he
wrote.146 Stevens directed even harsher words at the passage just
quoted. The first sentence “reminds me of Anatole France’s
observation: ‘[T]he majestic equality of the la[w], forbid[s] rich and
poor alike to sleep under bridges, to beg in the streets, and to steal
their bread,’ ” he wrote.147 Stevens then attacked the passage’s author,
to whom he had administered the oath following Rehnquist’s death in
2005, for relying on the judgment in Brown:
THE CHIEF JUSTICE fails to note that it was only black
schoolchildren who were so ordered; indeed, the history books
do not tell stories of white children struggling to attend black
schools. In this and other ways, THE CHIEF JUSTICE rewrites
the history of one of this Court’s most important decisions.148
To underscore the depth of his concern, Stevens repeated a charge
Roberts had levied earlier that Term to object to the Court’s reversal,
through an opinion by Stevens, of a Texas death sentence: “It is a
familiar adage that history is written by the victors.”149 Stevens went so
144

Id. at 747-48 (omitting citation to Brown II, 349 U.S. 294, 300-01 (1955)).
Id. at 799-800, 799 nn. 3-4 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (quoting and citing Wygant
v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 313, 316 (1986) (Stevens, J., dissenting)).
Stevens joined “in its entirety” a lengthy dissent, which he termed “eloquent and
unanswerable,” yet found it “appropriate to add these words.” Id. at 798 (Stevens, J.,
dissenting) (referring to id. at 803-69 (Breyer, J., dissenting, joined by Stevens, Souter
& Ginsburg, JJ.)).
146
Id. at 800.
147
Id. at 799 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (quoting ANATOLE FRANCE, LE LYS ROUGE (THE
RED LILY) 95 (Winifred Stephens trans., 6th ed. 1922)).
148
Id.; see Charles Babington & Peter Baker, Roberts Confirmed as 17th Chief Justice,
WASH. POST, Sept. 30, 2005, at A1; Linda Greenhouse, Chief Justice Rehnquist Dies at
80, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 4, 2005, at A1; cf. Warren Richey, The Quiet Ascent of Justice
Stevens, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, July 9, 2004, at 1 (offering account of Stevens’s role
on Court in years immediately preceding Rehnquist’s passing).
149
Seattle Schools, 551 U.S. at 799 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (quoting Brewer v.
145
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far as to declare that “no Member of the Court that I joined in 1975”
— including, of course, the recently departed Rehnquist — “would
have agreed with today’s decision.”150
III. A NARRATIVE OF EQUALLY IMPARTIAL GOVERNMENT
The Court that Stevens joined in 1975 had sustained a withering
attack not long before. Accompanying an article entitled “The
Supreme Court: The Last Plantation” was a drawing of a portico
framed by Doric columns.151 All about were fan-wielding guards, a
window washer, a gardener, a carpenter, a washerwoman, and, at the
bottom of a staircase, messengers. All black, they served the men
posing on the porch: nine Justices, each clad in the white linen suit of
what then was called a Southern gentleman. At the center of the
besuited group was Chief Justice Warren E. Burger, a mint julep
poised on his lap. Behind him stood Thurgood Marshall: the first
African-American Justice seemed complacent as he held a lighted cigar
at a jaunty angle.152 Inside appeared a photograph of Justice Harry A.
Blackmun accepting “an assist from the court’s robing attendant,” an
African-American man who looked no younger than the Justice he
served.153 In six tabloid pages, author Nina Totenberg, to this day a
Court reporter,154 delivered a scathing critique of race relations.
Totenberg reported that all the Court’s secretaries were white, and that
“next term will see the second black law clerk in the court’s
history.”155 She laid blame on Justice William O. Douglas for the
firings of a black laborer who dated Douglas’s white law clerk and of a
black messenger who refused to serve at Douglas’s house party.156 An
attorney told her that employees had little recourse, not only because
Quarterman, 127 S. Ct. 1706, 1720 (2007) (Roberts, C.J., dissenting)).
150
Id. at 803.
151
See Nina Totenberg, The Supreme Court: The Last Plantation, NEW TIMES, July
26, 1974, at 26 (including drawing described in text).
152
See id. at 27.
153
Id. at 29.
154
See Biography of Nina Totenberg, NPR, http://www.npr.org/templates/story/
story.php?storyId=2101289 (last visited July 1, 2009) (stating that National Public
Radio hired Totenberg in 1975 — a year after publication of the article described in
the text — and that she has covered the Court for NPR ever since).
155
Totenberg, supra note 151, at 30.
156
Id. at 26, 28. The dating couple, whose story also is told in BOB WOODWARD &
SCOTT ARMSTRONG, THE BRETHREN 243-44 (1979), later married. Totenberg, supra note
151, at 28 (reporting further that “Frankfurter called” the messenger and “begged him
not to press the case,” and that the messenger was reinstated as an employee of “the
marshal’s office, with his salary reduced one notch”).
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civil rights statutes did not cover the Court, but also because, as he
put it, “It’s very scary to go after the chief justice through the judicial
system.”157 Totenberg quoted an unnamed “white court employee”
who said: “I was really shocked when I came here. The way this place
is run reminds you of an Atlanta plantation in the 19th century.”158
She wrote too of a “well-educated black messenger” who, when
refused a promotion in 1971, was told that the position to which he
aspired “was a white man’s job”; he said: “Those words that are on this
building — ‘equal justice under the law,’ they don’t apply to us here
inside. The justices are liberal with everyone else, but not here in their
own backyard.”159
A. To the Court
It was to that “backyard” that John Paul Stevens, who would go on
to write of “equal justice under law,” arrived to replace Douglas.160
Stevens hired a young woman who had been working on the staff of
another Chicago judge.161 Nellie A. Pitts thus became the first African
American to serve as a Justice’s chief secretary; indeed, she was one of
the first African-American women to hold a position at the Court
much higher than that of seamstress.162
The Court in fact had proved “liberal” on the issue of public school
desegregation. Most of Stevens’s new colleagues had been part of the
unanimous Court that in 1970 approved busing as a means of
desegregation.163 Of the Justices subsequently appointed by Richard M.
Nixon, a President opposed to busing,164 even Rehnquist would allow
157
Totenberg, supra note 151, at 28 (quoting Robert Wallace, member of
Washington Lawyers Committee for Civil Rights Under Law); see id. (noting that the
Court “is exempt from the Civil Service Act” and “the Civil Rights Act of 1964”).
Unlike this quotation, much in Totenberg’s article was anonymous and anecdotal, a
deficiency that she attributed to official stonewalling. See id.
158
Id. at 26.
159
Id.
160
See supra text accompanying note 18 (quoting Stevens’s invocation of “equal
justice under law”); see also McFadden, supra note 48 (reporting on President Gerald
R. Ford’s choice of Stevens to succeed Douglas).
161
Interview with Nellie A. Pitts in Virginia Beach, Va. (Apr. 8, 2008) [hereinafter
4/8/08 Pitts Interview].
162
See Totenberg, supra note 151, at 30. Pitts, who would work as Stevens’s chief
secretary until her retirement in 2006, recalled that by the time she arrived another
African-American woman, Emily Potter, was working as an assistant secretary in
Justice Marshall’s chambers. 4/8/08 Pitts Interview, supra note 161.
163
Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1 (1971).
164
See James M. Naughton, Nixon Disavows H.E.W. Proposal on School Busing, N.Y.
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that the Constitution permitted such a measure.165 But agreement
broke down as litigation moved beyond de jure segregation in
education to other sectors and to less overt forms of discrimination.166
The Court agreed not at all on whether and to what extent the law
permitted the government to give minorities preference in academia or
in employment.167 Its members the products of a profession that
included almost no persons of color,168 the Court on the whole
remained conservative with regard to issues of race.
The newest arrival was, of course, a product of that same profession.
Stevens had been a leader in his bar association when Nixon tapped
him in 1970 to become a federal appellate judge.169 At the time Stevens
had studied law, schools like Northwestern admitted few AfricanAmerican students.170 When he had worked at the Supreme Court, all
TIMES, Aug. 4, 1971, at 1.
165
Bustop, Inc. v. L.A. Bd. of Educ., 439 U.S. 1380, 1383 (1978) (opinion in
chambers) (Rehnquist, J.), quoted in Seattle Schools, 551 U.S. 701, 824 (2007) (Breyer,
J., dissenting, joined by Stevens, Souter & Ginsburg, JJ.), and discussed id. at 802-03
(Stevens, J., dissenting). Although this Article treats Rehnquist’s views on school
desegregation only in relation to those of Stevens, deserving mention is recent
scholarship such as Brad Snyder, What Would Justice Holmes Do (WWJHD)?:
Rehnquist’s Plessy Memo, Majoritarianism, and Parents Involved, 69 OHIO ST. L.J. 873
(2008), which aligns Rehnquist’s analysis in his 1952 clerk’s memorandum, not with
the majority, but rather with the dissenters in Seattle Schools. See supra notes 10-11
and accompanying text.
166
See, e.g., Keyes v. Sch. Dist. No. 1, 413 U.S. 189 (1973) (splintering on question
of whether segregation in Denver public schools was intentional); Jones v. Alfred H.
Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409 (1968) (dividing 7–2 on whether Constitution reaches
discrimination in housing when practiced by private individuals).
167
The judgment in DeFunis v. Odegaard, 416 U.S. 312 (1974) (per curiam),
indicated fissures that would become apparent in later decisions, discussed supra text
accompanying notes 96-150. Among those in DeFunis who voted against dismissing as
moot the underlying challenge to affirmative action was Douglas, who filed a long
opinion insisting that such programs violate the Constitution. Id. at 320-48 (Douglas,
J., dissenting). All other Justices, including the other three dissenters, kept silent. See
id. at 348-50 (Brennan, J., dissenting, joined by Douglas, White & Marshall, JJ.).
168
Statistics for this period indicate that in 1982 — seven years after Stevens joined
the Court — nonminorities received more than 90 percent of all J.D. degrees, while
African Americans earned 4.2 percent, Hispanics 2.3 percent, and Asians 1.3 percent.
See U.S. EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMM’N, DIVERSITY IN LAW FIRMS 12-14
(2003), available at http://www.eeoc.gov/stats/reports/diversitylaw/lawfirms.pdf
[hereinafter EEOC].
169
See MANASTER, supra note 26, at 37 (describing Stevens’s Chicago Bar
Association activities); John Paul Stevens, Bar Association Defends Post Conviction Act,
CHI. TRIB., Oct. 18, 1952, at 11 (publishing letter Stevens wrote on behalf of
Association’s Public Information Committee).
170
See FLORENCE HAMLISH LEVINSOHN, HAROLD WASHINGTON: A POLITICAL BIOGRAPHY
67-71 (1983) (stating that Washington had been the only African American in
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law clerks were white men, and though lawyers like Thurgood
Marshall could argue before the Court, they could not eat in the
cafeteria.171 At the time of his Supreme Court appointment, Stevens
lived in the nearly all-white suburb of Burr Ridge;172 his Chicago
practice, like his occasional forays into public service, had focused
largely on corporate matters.173 As Stevens himself recalled much later,
he had little acquaintance with African-American attorneys.174
Although whites and blacks have populated Chicago since its
founding, the city long has been one of America’s most segregated.175
When Stevens was a boy, the South Side included many AfricanAmerican neighborhoods, some like the one described in the
contemporaneous novel Native Son.176 Stevens’s own South Side
neighborhood of Hyde Park stood apart as an enclave of whites living
next to the University of Chicago.177 The future Justice attended the
university’s Laboratory School, then all white, and the servants at the
boy’s home were of Scandinavian descent.178 Matters were much the
same in the commercial center where the Stevens family had made its
fortune. On the margins of downtown, Chicago’s post–World War I
population boom had given rise to places where people of different
races mixed openly.179 Within the Loop, however, establishments

Northwestern’s Class of 1952).
171
Interview with Judge Louis H. Pollak in Phila., Pa. (Jan. 4, 2008) [hereinafter
1/4/08 Pollak Interview] (recalling treatment of African-American attorneys in
October Term 1948, when Pollak succeeded Stevens as Rutledge’s clerk); see Green,
supra note 82, at 138, 138 n.167 (writing of discrimination in Capitol cafeteria);
Rosen, supra note 50, at 6 (reproducing photograph of Spring Term 1948 law clerks).
172
McFadden, supra note 48; see BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE,
1970 CENSUS OF POPULATION, VOL. I: CHARACTERISTICS OF THE POPULATION, PT. 15,
ILLINOIS, SEC. 1 (1973), available at http://www2.census.gov/prod2/decennial/
documents/1970a_il1-01.pdf (stating that in 1970, 1,637 persons lived in Burr Ridge,
all but ten of whom were white).
173
See supra text accompanying notes 78-80 (discussing this work).
174
10/2/07 Stevens Interview, supra note 43.
175
See David M. Cutler et al., The Rise and Decline of the American Ghetto, 107 J.
POL. ECON. 455, 457 (1999) (stating that for a hundred years Chicago has ranked
among the top five most segregated U.S. cities); see also RYDELL, supra note 53, at 166
(noting that “Jean Baptiste Point DuSable, a black Frenchman,” was “Chicago’s first
settler”).
176
RICHARD WRIGHT, NATIVE SON (Perennial Library 1986) (1940).
177
10/2/07 Stevens Interview, supra note 43.
178
Id.
179
See Scott Newman, Chicago’s Loop in the Early Twentieth Century, JAZZ AGE
CHICAGO: URBAN LEISURE FROM 1893 TO 1945, Aug. 1, 1998, http://chicago.urbanhistory.org/int/intro04.shtml.
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employed and catered to whites.180 Separation was not imposed by law.
Crossing the unwritten line nonetheless carried social consequences,
as vividly depicted in Passing, a 1929 novel that opens with a chance
meeting between two women with African ancestry, each presenting
herself as white in order to be served in the restaurant of an elegant
Chicago hotel.181 Conflict erupted on occasion. In the 1930s, the
NAACP complained about how African Americans fared at the
Century of Progress World’s Fair.182 Deadly race riots had roiled
Chicago in 1919, less than a year before Stevens’s birth.183 Unrest
likewise was evident in the decade before Stevens became a judge:
Reverend Martin Luther King, Jr., waged a contested campaign for fair
housing in Chicago;184 a predawn police raid on a Chicago apartment
left two Black Panthers dead and four wounded;185 and Chicago
Democratic Convention riots occurred against the backdrop of the
hotel the Stevens family had built.186 Stevens himself appears to have
made no public comment on the events of the Sixties, with the
exception of a wry letter about a controversial new work of art.187
180

10/2/07 Stevens Interview, supra note 43 (recalling no African Americans who
worked at the Stevens Hotel, and adding that “in the ’30s jobs were scarce”); see
Newman, supra note 179; cf. Payne, supra note 31 (dating stepped-up hiring of African
Americans by the Chas. A. Stevens department store to World War II).
181
NELLA LARSEN, PASSING (Penguin Books 1997) (1929). Larsen placed the scene
in a hotel modeled after the Drake, id. at 13 n.2, a competitor of the Stevens; both
hotels now are owned by the Hilton Co. See ALLEGRINI, supra note 30, at 82, 109.
182
See RYDELL, supra note 53, at 165-71 (describing how initial enthusiasm of
African-American leaders gave way to concern respecting the lack of jobs for African
Americans, the absence of exhibits to African Americans, and refusals to serve AfricanAmerican fairgoers).
183
See THE CHICAGO COMMISSION ON RACE RELATIONS, THE NEGRO IN CHICAGO: A
STUDY OF RACE RELATIONS AND A RACE RIOT (1922) (describing 1919 riots, in report of
later-appointed inquiry commission).
184
See ALEXANDER POLIKOFF, WAITING FOR GAUTREAUX: A STORY OF SEGREGATION,
HOUSING, AND THE BLACK GHETTO 40-47 (Nw. Univ. Press 2006) (describing King’s
1966 Chicago campaign).
185
See John Kifner, Police in Chicago Slay 2 Panthers, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 5, 1969, at 1.
Stevens was among those proposed to lead an inquiry into the raid. U.S. Opposes Plea
for Data of Panther Raid Jury, CHI. TRIB., June 17, 1970, at 10. Nothing came of this,
however; by then Stevens was a candidate for a federal judgeship. See Aldo Beckman,
Percy Backs Lawyer for U.S. Court, CHI. TRIB., Apr. 11, 1970, at 2.
186
See ALLEGRINI & DAVIS, supra note 40, at 42-45; see also Philo Hutcheson,
Democratic National Convention of 1968, Violence at, in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN
RACE RIOTS (Walter C. Rucker & James N. Upton eds., 2007) (relating 1968 protests
to civil rights movement).
187
John Paul Stevens, Picasso’s Contribution, CHI. TRIB., Aug. 21, 1967, at 20
(congratulating sculptor Pablo Picasso for persuading “our wonderful mayor,”
Democrat Richard J. Daley, to place in city’s center “a world-famous statue of an
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As a Justice, Stevens early on took issue with what he termed “the
legality of ‘reverse discrimination’ or ‘affirmative action’ programs.”188
In a case that he would have resolved on statutory grounds, Stevens
identified the issue as how one such program operated to deny a seat
in medical school to an identified white man, assertedly qualified.189
He first reached the question of constitutionality in 1980 in Fullilove;
there, he applied a market analysis, proclaimed the program lacking in
particulars, and dismissed it as “political patronage.”190 Stevens further
saw, in any “serious” categorization of individuals according to race,
the risk of a slide toward the evils of Nazism.191 It may be tempting to
dismiss these pronouncements as what was to be expected from a
conservative Republican appointee or, perhaps, as the maverick
utterances of someone expert in antitrust but not antidiscrimination
law. Yet any such dismissal is too simplistic, and not only because of
Stevens’s suggestion in Fullilove that the Constitution may permit
reparations for African Americans.192
As Stevens came of age he was well aware of discrimination against
one particular group — persons of Jewish ancestry. The assertion that
all members of that group were inferior was a core tenet of the Axis
Powers against whom Stevens helped to fight as a Navy codebreaker in
World War II. The baselessness of the assertion was apparent, for
Stevens’s studies had introduced him to many eminent Jews, including
Mortimer Adler at Chicago and Nathaniel Nathanson at
Northwestern.193 This issue of discrimination had surfaced in popular
culture, moreover, with the 1947 publication of Gentleman’s Agreement
and the Hollywood release of a film depicting that novel about antielephant”).
188
Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 413 (1978) (Stevens, J.,
concurring in judgment in part and dissenting in part).
189
Id. at 408.
190
Supra notes 96-117 and accompanying text (discussing Fullilove v. Klutznick,
448 U.S. 448, 532-33, 536-39, 541-43, 545-47 (1980) (Stevens, J., dissenting)).
191
Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 533-35, 541-42 (1980) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting).
192
See id. at 537 (Stevens, J., dissenting); Farber, supra note 90, at 2272-74, 228895 (analyzing Stevens’s reference to reparations).
193
See Stevens, Random, supra note 80, at 269-70 (repeating Nathanson’s anecdote
about clerking for Justice Louis Brandeis); see also CLIFF SLOAN & DAVID MCKEAN, THE
GREAT DECISION 177 (2009) (relating interview in which Stevens told authors that
during “his first few months in law school,” he examined Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S.
(1 Cranch) 137 (1803), “from every conceivable angle in a constitutional law class
taught by the man who would be his mentor, Professor Nathaniel Nathanson”); supra
text accompanying note 74 (discussing Adler); infra text accompanying note 203
(same); infra note 212 (mentioning Nathanson).
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Jewish prejudice among elites in New York and Connecticut.194 That
same year Stevens began his clerkship, alongside his Jewish co-clerk.195
The next year he wrote Rutledge that he had accepted a job offer from
a law firm, adding, “[C]ontrary to the practice of most of the
successful outfits in Chicago, there are several Jews in the
organization.”196 The firm that Stevens cofounded in 1952 comprised a
Protestant, a Catholic, and a Jew.197 Stevens’s sensitivity to the history
of the Jewish people, evident in Fullilove and elsewhere,198 offered a
prism through which the Justice could consider discrimination against
other groups.
The charge of patronage that Stevens levied in Fullilove likewise had
its source in personal experience. After all, he had grown up
Republican in a city run by a Democratic machine.199 Stevens’s stint as
an aide to a Congressional subcommittee, moreover, had impressed
upon him the role that bargaining plays in legislative action.200 His
investigation of the Illinois Supreme Court had laid bare corruption of
a presumably incorruptible public institution.201 The patronage
allegation in Fullilove thus reflected Stevens’s acute awareness that at
times government officials succumb to improper enticements; as he
put it, that “the sovereign” may breach its “fundamental duty to
govern impartially.”202

194
LAURA Z. HOBSON, GENTLEMAN’S AGREEMENT (1947); GENTLEMAN’S AGREEMENT
(Fox Studio Classics 1947).
195
10/1/07 Temko Interview, supra note 81.
196
9/4/48 Stevens Letter, supra note 24.
197
MANASTER, supra note 26, at 39.
198
Eugene R. Fidell, Justice John Paul Stevens and Judicial Deference in Military
Matters, 43 UC DAVIS L. REV. 999, 1006-10 (2010) (considering Justice Stevens’s
comment about anti-Semitism in the Weinberger case).
199
See Stevens, Learning, supra note 74, at 1562-63 (reviewing patronage cases on
which he sat as judge); supra text accompanying notes 28-73 (describing Stevens’s
childhood). See generally MIKE ROYKO, BOSS: RICHARD J. DALEY OF CHICAGO (1971)
(giving account of Chicago’s Democratic machine).
200
Interview with John Paul Stevens, Assoc. Justice, U.S. Supreme Court, in Wash.,
D.C. (Mar. 30, 2006) [hereinafter 3/30/06 Stevens Interview] (describing how,
through work on organized baseball inquiry mentioned supra text accompanying note
79, “I got to learn about the interaction between members of the committee,” and
allowing that “[i]n 80% of their work partisanship didn’t play a part”).
201
See supra text accompanying note 75.
202
Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 533 n.1 (1980) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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B. Equally Impartial Government
The term “equally impartial government” denotes a concept that
Stevens has invoked both in judicial opinions and in speeches; in so
doing, he has linked the Equal Protection Clause to the substantive
guarantee of “liberty” to be found in the Due Process Clause.203 In a
1986 lecture that drew upon the work of Mortimer Adler and John
Stuart Mill, Stevens spoke of a person’s liberty interest “in not being
treated less favorably than the average member of society unless there
is an acceptable justification for such treatment.”204 He named two
ways this liberty may be invaded: when the “person is branded as a
‘felon’ ” without proper hearing, and when “he is treated less favorably
than the majority of his peers simply because his skin is not of the
same color as theirs.”205 That the examples tended to blend equal
protection and due process concepts was not unintentional. Stevens
recalled that certain precedents often considered as dealing exclusively
with equal protection in fact also rest on due process grounds.206
Among these was the sweeping result in Brown, which depended in
part on the Court’s determination in a companion case that
schoolchildren segregated by federal actors in the District of Columbia
suffered “an arbitrary deprivation of their liberty in violation of the
Due Process Clause.”207 Stevens concluded:
Thus the Court has made it perfectly clear that a burden on
the individual interest in equal respect and equal treatment
may constitute an arbitrary deprivation of liberty without any
inquiry into the procedures that accompanied the deprivation.
One of the elements of liberty is the right to be respected as a
human being.208

203
See, e.g., id. at 533, 533 n.2 (Stevens, J., dissenting); see also supra note 92
(quoting clauses).
204
John Paul Stevens, The Third Branch of Liberty, 41 U. MIAMI L. REV. 277, 283
(1986) (publishing Nov. 1986 lecture, University of Miami School of Law)
[hereinafter Stevens, Liberty]; see id. at 278-83 (discussing MORTIMER J. ADLER, SIX
GREAT IDEAS (Macmillan Publ’g 1981) and JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY AND
CONSIDERATIONS ON REPRESENTATIVE GOVERNMENT (R. McCallum ed., 1946) (1859)).
205
Stevens, Liberty, supra note 204, at 283-84.
206
Id. at 284 (citing Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967) (invaliding
antimiscegenation statute on due process as well as equal protection grounds)).
207
Id. (quoting Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 500 (1954)). The ruling was
necessary, that is, because unlike the Fourteenth Amendment, the Fifth Amendment,
which constrains federal officials, makes no explicit mention of equal protection. See
supra note 93 (quoting amendments).
208
Stevens, Liberty, supra note 204, at 284.
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This formulation is noteworthy for its elision of individuality and
equality, in such a way that although race is one reason that a person’s
fundamental rights may be violated, it is not the only one. It suggests an
understanding of the state’s duty under the Constitution that has some
roots in two experiences of Stevens that had nothing to do with race.
One experience recalled by this formulation is Stevens’s pro bono
representation of a convicted murderer.209 The defendant had claimed
that the conviction was the result of an illegally obtained confession;
specifically, that Chicago police had “hit him repeatedly with his fists
and with a night stick,” then handcuffed and blindfolded him, put a
rope “in between the handcuffs,” hanged him from a door, and struck
him “until he lapsed into unconsciousness.”210 This continued, he
said, until he gave police the confession they demanded.211 Stevens
recalled years later that he had been dubious upon his first visit to
Joliet state prison to interview the client whom he had been appointed
to represent in postconviction proceedings. “I said, ‘Wasn’t — It must
have been terribly painful,’ assuming the pain would have been on his
wrists,” Stevens recounted. “He replied that the pain was all in his
arms and shoulders and I thought, ‘Gee, this guy’s telling the truth. He
convinced me. That increased my diligence in going after the case.’ ”
In a decision to which Stevens since has referred, the Illinois Supreme
Court reversed his client’s sixteen-year-old conviction.212
The second experience to which Stevens’s formulation hearkens is,
of course, the criminal case that his family endured just as he entered
his teen years.213 Though a child born into a world of privilege,
Stevens must have felt immense distress during this first real
engagement with government. His family lost the grand hotel where
the boy had been treated like a Jazz Age prince. His grandfather was
the victim of a stroke, his uncle a suicide. Detectives arrested his
father at the family home; this, like all subsequent events, served as
209
People v. La Frana, 122 N.E.2d 583 (Ill. 1954). Another such example may be
Marino v. Ragen, 332 U.S. 561 (1947), which raised a challenge to Illinois
postconviction proceedings on which Stevens worked as a Rutledge clerk and
thereafter, in other, similar cases, as an attorney in Chicago. See Amann, Stevens, supra
note 5, at 1589-93, 1598 (describing Stevens’s role respecting Marino and related
cases).
210
La Frana, 122 N.E.2d at 585.
211
Id.
212
Id. at 587; see Chavez v. Martinez, 538 U.S. 760, 788 n.2 (2003) (Stevens, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part) (citing La Frana, 122 N.E.2d at 586-87);
Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298, 366 n.5 (1985) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (same);
Stevens, Random, supra note 80, at 270 (discussing La Frana).
213
See supra text accompanying notes 28-73 (detailing family history).
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fodder for newspapers in Chicago and beyond. In a robbery inspired
by that publicity, gunmen dressed as police forced the boy, then still
twelve, to open the safe containing his diary. The happenstance arrival
of a neighbor prompted the robbers to leave, thus ending an incident
that decades later Justice Stevens narrated with a slow sigh.214 When
he was a boy of twelve, that unsolved crime coupled with the
unwarranted prosecution of his father no doubt embodied a very real
failure to protect by the government.
C. Interpreting Impartiality
Whether termed impartiality or equality, Stevens’s conceptualization
is susceptible to different interpretations. Throughout much of U.S.
history, some have advanced a formalist interpretation of equality, by
which government may not consider race in any manner or for any
reason. Often invoked, as it was by other dissenters in Fullilove, is the
1896 characterization of the Constitution as “color-blind.”215 Stevens
had considered the formalist interpretation early in his judicial career,
but in Fullilove in 1980 he made clear that it had “not convinced”
him.216 Six years later in Wygant, he articulated a substantive
interpretation that he had found convincing.217 Since then, Stevens has
written with consistency that the sovereign fulfills its duty of
impartiality when it considers race in service of a “future benefit,”
such as maintaining an integrated faculty or police force, encouraging
diversity in communications, or preparing schoolchildren to live in an
integrated world.218 The approach requires a judge to determine
214
10/2/07 Stevens Interview, supra note 43 (recalling that the robbers “actually
said they’d take it out on the kids”); see Robbed, supra note 63 (stating that Stevens’s
father had not reported the robbery because of threats made against his children).
215
Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 522-23 (1980) (Stewart, J., dissenting,
joined by Rehnquist, J.) (quoting Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 559 (1896)
(Harlan, J., dissenting)); see also, e.g., Seattle Schools, 551 U.S. 791, 731 n.14 (2007)
(plurality opinion) (Roberts, C.J., joined by Scalia, Thomas & Alito, JJ.) (quoting
Plessy dissent).
216
Fullilove, 448 U.S. at 548 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
217
See supra text accompanying notes 118-34 (discussing Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of
Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 313-19 (1986) (Stevens, J., dissenting)).
218
Metro Broad. v. FCC, 497 U.S. 547, 601 (1990) (Stevens, J., concurring)
(writing favorably of “future benefit” in communications); see Adarand Constructors,
Inc. v. Peña, 515 U.S. 200, 243 (1995) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (linking affirmative
action plan to duty to govern impartially); Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S.
267, 314-15 (1986) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (referring to faculty and police force);
Seattle Schools, 551 U.S. at 799-800, 799 nn.3-4 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (referring to
schoolchildren); cf. City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 511-12 (1989)
(Stevens, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment) (explaining his rejection
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whether a program looks backward, excluding improperly on the basis
of irrational stereotype, or looks forward, aiming properly to include
more groups in a sector of society.219 The approach dovetails,
moreover, with another that is central to Stevens’s jurisprudence: his
opposition to reliance on judge-created levels of scrutiny to decide
claims arising under the Constitution’s equal protection guarantee.
“There is only one Equal Protection Clause. It requires every State to
govern impartially. It does not direct the courts to apply one standard
of review in some cases and a different standard in other cases,”
Stevens declared in objecting to application of middle-tier scrutiny in a
1976 sex discrimination case.220 He has maintained that view since.221
In two respects, therefore, Stevens has preferred the difficult exercise
of judgment over the mechanical ease of formalism. In point of fact,
Stevens’s criticism of formalist approaches to equality became more
pointed over time, such that in 2007 he conjured a literary classic to
expose the emptiness of suggesting that a privileged group suffers the
same deprivation to the same extent as its unprivileged counterpart.222
Embrace of substantive equality goals similarly was evident in his use
of metaphors like “engine of oppression” to describe discrimination.223
Stevens’s rhetoric changed as did the society in which he lived and
worked.
From the start, Stevens’s staff at the Court included African
Americans; in addition, his work there put him in close proximity to
Thurgood Marshall, whom he had seen argue Sipuel in 1948, and later

of affirmative action program in part because it did not focus on “probable impact on
the future”).
219
See supra text accompanying notes 132-33.
220
Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 211-12 (1976) (Stevens, J., concurring); see id. at
197 (majority opinion) (Brennan, J.) (stating in a passage of the opinion that four
Justices joined in full, but about which two concurring Justices expressed hesitation,
“that classifications by gender must serve important governmental objectives and must
be substantially related to achievement of those objectives”).
221
See, e.g., Seattle Schools, 551 U.S. at 800 (Stevens, J., dissenting); Adarand
Constructors, 515 U.S. at 246 (Stevens, J., dissenting). For space reasons this Article
does not examine fully Stevens’s position on this matter, which is treated in each of
the articles cited supra note 90.
222
Supra text accompanying note 144 (quoting Seattle Schools, 551 U.S. at 800
(Stevens, J., dissenting)); see Diane Marie Amann, Way-Faring Justice, INTLAWGRRLS, June
29, 2007, http://intlawgrrls.blogspot.com/2007/06/way-faring-justice.html (analyzing this
reference).
223
Adarand Constructors, 515 U.S. at 243 (Stevens, J., dissenting); see Wards Cove
Packing Co. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642, 663 n.4 (1989) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (finding
in salmon industry “aspects of a plantation economy”).
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to Clarence Thomas.224 In October Term 1984 — the Term before he
approved the affirmative action program at issue in Wygant — Stevens
employed Howard University law graduate James E. McCollum, Jr., as
his first African-American law clerk.225 Many members of
underrepresented groups subsequently clerked for the Justice.226
Outside the Court, even though numbers overall remained low,227
minorities increasingly gained positions of prominence. Harold
Washington, the only African American in the Northwestern law class
that was graduated five years after Stevens, had become the first black
mayor of Chicago.228 Among the African Americans serving in the
Cabinet were Transportation Secretary William T. Coleman, Jr., who
had begun a Supreme Court clerkship just as Stevens finished his own;
Health and Human Services Secretary Patricia Roberts Harris; and
Secretary of State Colin Powell.229 And when Seattle Schools was
decided, the junior Senator from Illinois was Barack Obama, like
Stevens a Hyde Parker who had taught law part-time at the University
of Chicago; in 2009, of course, Obama became the first AfricanAmerican President of the United States.230 A long and winding path
thus lay between Stevens’s derision of the Congressional Black Caucus
224

See supra text accompanying notes 1-7; see also Linda Greenhouse, Thomas
Sworn in as 106th Justice, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 24, 1991, at A18. It was in this period too,
of course, that women first joined the Court. See Adam Liptak, The Waves Minority
Justices Always Make, N.Y. TIMES, May 30, 2009, at WK1.
225
4/8/08 Pitts Interview, supra note 161. Like Justice Marshall, McCollum earned
his J.D. degree at Howard University School of Law. Id.
226
Two of Stevens’s other African-American clerks took part in this symposium.
Jamal Greene, The So-Called Right to Privacy, 43 UC DAVIS L. REV. 715 (2010); Teresa
W. Roseborough, Remarks of Ms. Teresa Wynn Roseborough, 43 UC DAVIS L. REV. 939
(2010) (transcribed remarks); see also Bleich et al., supra note 91 (stating that
Stevens’s choices of law clerks “ensured that his chambers reflect the increasing
number of women entering the legal field, and evolving notions of gender parity”).
227
Statistics indicate that in 2003 about 80 percent of all J.D. degrees were awarded
to whites. See EEOC, supra note 168, at 12-14. The percentage of minorities receiving
J.D.s more than doubled between 1982 and 2003 — from 7.8 to 19.4 percent of the
total. See id. Specifically, African Americans received 7.2 percent; Hispanics, 5.7
percent; and Asians, 6.5 percent of the J.D.s awarded in 2003. See id.
228
See LEVINSOHN, supra note 170, at 66-70.
229
Gerald M. Boyd, Patricia R. Harris, Carter Aide, Dies, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 24, 1985,
at 36; Alison Mitchell, Senate Confirms 7 Cabinet Members at Once, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 21,
2001, § 1, at 14; Notes on People; Coleman Confirmed for Cabinet, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 4,
1975, at 30; 1/4/08 Pollak Interview, supra note 171 (recalling that Coleman, Court’s
first African-American law clerk, began to work for Frankfurter about same time that
Pollak succeeded Stevens as Rutledge clerk).
230
Peter Baker, Obama Takes Oath, and Nation in Crisis Embraces the Moment, N.Y.
TIMES, Jan. 21, 2009, at A1. Just before Obama was sworn in, Stevens administered the
oath of office to Vice President Joseph R. Biden, Jr. Id.
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in 1980 and his observation in 2007 that “children of all races benefit
from integrated classrooms and playgrounds.”231
CONCLUSION
The life of Justice John Paul Stevens has been marked by change, in
society and in his own jurisprudence. At times Stevens has rebuffed
this claim. Not long ago a television reporter asked the Justice
routinely dubbed a leading liberal how he would describe himself.232
With a bit of a chuckle, Stevens repeated the label given him upon his
nomination to the Court in 1975: “As a moderate conservative. I don’t
really think I’ve changed. I think there’ve been a lot of changes in the
Court.”233 In a speech delivered right after he had administered the
oath of office to Chief Justice Roberts, however, Stevens said “that
learning on the bench has been one of the most important and
rewarding aspects of my own experience over the last thirty-five
years.”234 He attributed his own jurisprudence on affirmative action to
just such learning — learning that, as he put it, “justifications based
on past sins may be less persuasive than those predicated on
anticipated future benefits.”235 The speech acknowledged many of the
changes in Stevens’s equality jurisprudence that this Article has both
charted and endeavored to explain.
It would be incorrect to infer that Stevens’s jurisprudence in this
area has moved in a linear fashion, from the hostility of early opinions

231

Seattle Schools, 551 U.S. 701, 800, 800 n.3 (2007) (Stevens, J., dissenting); see
Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 541-42 (1980) (Stevens, J., dissenting). Taking
into account statute-grounded decisions, the path began with Stevens’s 1978 rejection
of a medical school admissions program in Regents of University of California v. Bakke,
438 U.S. 265, 408-21 (1978) (Stevens, J., concurring in judgment in part and
dissenting in part), and continues through his vote in favor of a firefighter selection
program in Ricci v. DeStefano, 129 S. Ct. 2689, 2689-2710 (2009) (Ginsburg, J.,
dissenting, joined by Stevens, Breyer & Souter, JJ.).
232
See Charles Lane, High Court Rejects Detainee Tribunals, WASH. POST, June 30,
2006, at A1 (writing of “Stevens, the most liberal member of the court”); Jerry
Markon, Two Justices Clash over Race and Death Penalty, WASH. POST, Oct. 21, 2008, at
A10 (calling Stevens “a leader of the court’s liberal wing”).
233
Nightline: The Silent Justice (ABC television broadcast Jan. 3, 2007), available at
http://abcnews.go.com/Video/playerIndex?id=2766752 (showing Stevens speaking to
reporter Jan Crawford Greenburg); see McFadden, supra note 48 (writing in story
about Stevens’s 1975 nomination that he “is regarded as a moderate conservative with
nominally Republican credentials but little background or interest in politics”).
234
Stevens, Learning, supra note 74, at 1567; see Babington & Baker, supra note
148 (reporting on swearing-in).
235
Stevens, Learning, supra note 74, at 1565.
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like Fullilove to the embrace in later ones like Seattle Schools.236 For as
a law clerk in 1948, Stevens had suggested the Court “take judicial
notice” in the case of Ada Lois Sipuel that “the doctrine of segregation
is itself a violation of the Constitutional requirement.”237 In this
writing six years before Brown, Stevens evinced an understanding of
equality that was precocious, even astounding.238 Justice Stevens later
demurred, “That was the common view of all the law clerks.”239 This
well may be true, but no other clerk appears to have advanced the
unconstitutionality of segregation itself as a reason for voting in
Sipuel’s favor.240 Nor has Stevens backed off the urgency in his call to
search for “any chance of granting any relief” to Sipuel.241 He has gone
so far as to cite two cases that Term — Sipuel and the restrictive
covenant cases — as examples of “judicial activism” with which “I
now agree.”242 Recently, moreover, Stevens criticized the Court that
decided Brown for not having required immediate desegregation: “I’ve
always thought that one of the sad things was the ‘all deliberate speed’
remedy in the second case.”243
How to square these statements with Stevens’s first opinions on
affirmative action? Given that no one proceeds through life with
perfect consistency, it might be better to dodge the question, perhaps
by relegating desegregation and affirmative action to separate
categories. Yet the artificiality of such a separation is apparent in a case
like Seattle Schools, in which Justices relied on affirmative action
precedents in order to analyze efforts to avoid resegregation.244 Some
236

See supra text accompanying notes 96-148 (discussing these opinions).
JPS Fisher Mem., supra note 5, at 2.
238
Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954) (adopting this view, not by judicial
notice, but rather after two rounds of briefing and argument).
239
3/30/06 Stevens Interview, supra note 200.
240
See 1/4/08 Pollak Interview, supra note 171 (stating that when Pollak clerked
for Rutledge following Term, most clerks favored Court’s movements toward school
desegregation); supra note 8.
241
JPS Fisher Mem., supra note 5, at 3.
242
John Paul Stevens, Judicial Activism: Ensuring the Powers and Freedoms Conceived
by the Framers for Today’s World, 16 CHI. B. ASS’N REC., Oct. 2002, at 25, 26-27
(referring to both cases without citation); see supra text accompanying notes 1-9, 8385 (discussing cases mentioned); cf. Stevens, Learning, supra note 74, at 1564
(declaring himself “proud” of his lone vote, in Palmore v. Sidoti, 460 U.S. 1018 (1983),
to stay ruling below against white divorcée who sought to retain custody of her child
notwithstanding her interracial relationship).
243
3/30/06 Stevens Interview, supra note 200 (quoting Brown II, 349 U.S. 294, 30001 (1955), discussed supra text accompanying note 93, and adding that Court may
have erred in acting as “statesmen instead of judges”).
244
Supra text accompanying notes 140-50 (discussing Seattle Schools, 551 U.S. 701
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tentative responses thus seem worthwhile. Surely critical in Sipuel
were certain facts. A named individual had applied to study law, and
even though the state conceded her qualifications, the only door it
opened to her was “a law school for one person.”245 As a child, Stevens
had watched his father — indeed, his family — endure injustice at the
hands of the state.246 Clerk Stevens not only had just completed an
enviable law school career, but also was conscious of discrimination
that Jews had suffered in the profession notwithstanding their
qualifications.247 Patently, the state’s offer to Sipuel was so unjust as to
require an immediate and meaningful remedy. “It wasn’t a difficult
issue,” Stevens recalled. “It just seemed like just such an obvious
violation.”248 As a Justice, Stevens would come to emphasize the
“concept of equal justice under law,” that is, the constitutional duty of
the state “to govern impartially.”249 It is easy to see the state’s
treatment of Ada Lois Sipuel as a violation of that duty. Less obvious,
at least to Stevens in his early years on the Court, were large-scale
programs said to benefit unnamed members of minority groups rather
than named individuals, and to do so in order to make amends for
unspecified wrongs. Eventually he put to one side inquiry into the
injustices of the past and looked instead to a more just future. That
achieved, Stevens judged affirmative action among those measures that
the Constitution allows an equally impartial government.

(2007)).
245
JPS Fisher Mem., supra note 5, at 2; see Sipuel v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of
Okla., 332 U.S. 631, 632 (1948) (per curiam) (describing applicant as “concededly
qualified”); cf. Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 408 (1978) (Stevens, J.,
concurring in judgment in part and dissenting in part) (stressing that rights of named
individual were at stake in course of ruling in his favor).
246
See supra text accompanying notes 57-72.
247
See supra text accompanying notes 25, 190-96.
248
3/30/06 Stevens Interview, supra note 200.
249
Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 533 (1980) (Stevens, J., dissenting); see
supra text accompanying notes 204-24 (discussing Stevens’s theory).

